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Risk	  analysis	  is	  the	  determination	  of	  the	  likelihood	  of	  a	  disaster	  and	  possible	  consequences.	  In	  
order	  to	  begin	  this	  analysis,	  the	  hazards	  affecting	  a	  community	  must	  be	  identified.	  	  After	  
identification,	  data	  is	  collected	  in	  order	  to	  prepare	  a	  community	  hazards	  profile	  that	  will	  
characterize	  the	  nature	  and	  extent	  of	  these	  hazards.	  Finally,	  we	  do	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  risks	  
present.	  This	  analysis	  includes	  identifying	  community	  vulnerability	  indicators	  and	  the	  probability	  
of	  the	  hazard	  occurring.	   From	  this	  information,	  we	  explore	  the	  likely	  impact	  of	  the	  hazards	  on	  the	  
community.	  This	  exploration	  may	  include	  the	  use	  of	  hazard	  models	  and	  software	  such	  as	  GIS.	  This	  
analysis	  should	  provide	  useful	  and	  accurate	  information	  for	  decision-­‐-­‐-­‐makers	  working	  in	  risk	  
management	  or	  responsible	  for	  community	  hazard	  mitigation	  initiatives.	   Our	  goal	  is	  to	  provide	  
decision-­‐makers	  with	  the	  right	  information,	  at	  the	  right	  level	  of	  complexity	  and	  detail	  at	  the	  right	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time.	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  
The	  Process	  of	  Risk	  Analysis	  	  
	  	  
We	  are	  all	  vulnerable	  to	  some	  hazard.	  A	  community	  may	  be	  vulnerable	  to	  natural	  hazards	  
because	  it	  is	  located	  on	  a	  coastline	  and	  subject	  to	  hurricane	  winds	  or	  storm	  surge	  while	  another	  
community	  located	  in	  the	  mountains	  may	  be	  vulnerable	  to	  fire	  and	  floods.	  Some	  organizations	  
may	  be	  constrained	  in	  the	  location	  of	  their	  business.	  For	  example,	  a	  business	  may	  need	  to	  be	  
located	  near	  a	  major	  transportation	  route.	  	  As	  a	  result,	  it	  may	  be	  necessary	  to	  locate	  their	  
operation	  in	  a	  floodplain	  or	  near	  a	  coast.	  By	  utilizing	  risk	  analysis,	  the	  community	  or	  organization	  
can	  make	  informed	  decisions	  about	  their	  exposure	  to	  the	  local	  hazards.	  The	  risk	  analysis	  process	  
is	  used	  to	  assess	  this	  vulnerability.	  	  
	  
The	  process	  of	  risk	  analysis	  examines	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  risk	  from	  a	  hazard,	  when	  and	  where	  it	  
might	  occur,	  potential	  intensity,	  and	  the	  potential	  impact	  on	  people	  and	  property.	   The	  level	  of	  
risk	  for	  a	  disaster	  of	  any	  scale	  is	  expressed	  as	  a	  likelihood	  of	  the	  occurrence	  or	  frequency	  times	  its	  
consequences.	  Hence	  risk	  analysis	  must	  begin	  with	  hazard	  identification.	  With	  each	  hazard	  
identified	  the	  probability	  or	  frequency	  of	  occurrence	  of	  the	  hazard	  event	  and	  the	  consequences	  if	  
the	  event	  should	  occur	  is	  explored.	  The	  consequences	  could	  be	  loss	  of	  life,	  the	  socio-­‐-­‐-­‐cultural	  
impact,	  or	  economic,	  recovery,	  and	  environmental	  costs	  of	  a	  disaster.	  	  Once	  the	  analysis	  is	  
completed,	  the	  results	  of	  the	  risk	  analysis	  can	  be	  used	  in	  the	  problem	  solving	  and	  decision-­‐-­‐-­‐making	  
process	  to	  adopt	  strategies	  to	  reduce	  organizational	  or	  community	  vulnerability.	  
	  
In	  light	  of	  the	  inevitability	  of	  facing	  risk,	  individual	  families,	  organizations	  and	  communities	  must	  
make	  conscious	  choices	  about	  what	  is	  an	  “acceptable	  risk.”	  	  Hazard	  reduction	  policies	  can	  be	  
made	  with	  an	  understanding	  of	  what	  choices	  are	  possible	  and	  the	  consequences	  for	  any	  option.	  	  
The	  level	  of	  risk	  may	  be	  very	  limited	  so	  that	  nothing	  needs	  to	  be	  done	  to	  address	  it.	  	  Other	  
hazards	  may	  be	  more	  likely	  to	  occur	  and	  have	  the	  potential	  to	  cause	  extensive	  damage.	  	  The	  fact	  
is	  that	  some	  organizations	  and	  communities	  may	  be	  willing	  to	  live	  with	  a	  specific	  risk	  or	  not	  
willing	  to	  expend	  the	  resources	  necessary	  to	  reduce	  the	  adverse	  consequences	  that	  come	  with	  it	  
(Waugh	  2000).	   In	  order	  to	  assist	  in	  this	  decision	  making	  process,	  relevant	  analysis	  is	  conducted.	  
This	  analysis	  might	  include	  mapping	  the	  hazard	  to	  determine	  the	  spatial	  distribution	  of	  risk,	  such	  
as	  the	  risk	  associated	  with	  a	  gas	  or	  chemical	  leak.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  an	  area	  vulnerable	  to	  landslide,	  
this	  analysis	  could	  include	  the	  collection	  of	  data	  on	  the	  frequency	  and	  intensity	  of	  past	  landslides	  
and	  the	  local	  areas	  most	  vulnerable	  to	  future	  landslides.	  	  In	  many	  cases,	  especially	  when	  data	  is	  
lacking	  or	  needs	  to	  be	  interpreted,	  judgments	  are	  made	  concerning	  specific	  risk	  factors	  (i.e.,	  
factors	  that	  may	  significantly	  increase	  or	  decrease	  the	  risk	  of	  disaster	  or	  the	  threat	  to	  life	  and	  
property),	  and	  the	  vulnerability	  of	  the	  people	  and	  property	  within	  the	  risk	  area.	   The	  analysis	  
stemming	  from	  the	  available	  data	  and	  expertise	  as	  well	  as	  the	  use	  of	  judgment	  are	  part	  of	  the	  
hazards	  analysis	  process.	  
	  
Risk	  managers	  consider	  the	  likelihood	  and	  consequence	  of	  all	  (identified)	  hazards	  faced	  by	  their	  
jurisdiction,	  and	  they	  rank	  them	  according	  to	  priority.	   However,	  to	  understand	  the	  likelihood	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component	  of	  the	  risk	  analysis,	  one	  needs	  to	  understand	  probability.	   It	  is	  the	  probability	  of	  an	  
occurrence	  that	  informs	  a	  risk	  manager	  whether	  or	  not	  they	  should	  expect	  a	  hazard	  to	  affect	  their	  
community.	  	  Jardine	  and	  Hrudley	  suggest	  that	  a	  classical	  or	  frequency	  concept	  of	  probability	  be	  
used	  and	  focus	  on	  discrete	  events	  which	  examine	  all	  possible	  outcomes	  and	  the	  numerical	  
relationships	  among	  the	  chances	  of	  these	  outcomes	  (1997).	   In	  the	  real	  world,	  however,	  such	  
complete	  information	  is	  seldom,	  if	  ever,	  available.	   Therefore,	  risk	  analyses	  must	  include	  
subjective	  information	  along	  with	  detailed	  historical	  information.	  
	  
What	  is	  Risk?	  
	  
Risk	  is	  the	  product	  of	  likelihood	  or	  probability	  of	  a	  hazard	  occurring	  and	  the	  adverse	  
consequences	  from	  the	  event	  and	  viewed	  by	  many	  as	  our	  exposure	  to	  hazards.	  	  Figure	  5-­‐1	  
provides	  a	  model	  for	  defining	  risk.	  	  	  
 
Figure	  5-­‐-­‐-­‐1:	  Defining	  Risk	  
	  
This	  approach	  is	  based	  on	  the	  Royal	  Society	  Study	  Group	  (1992)	  defining	  risk	  as	  “the	  probability	  
that	  a	  particular	  adverse	  event	  occurs	  during	  a	  stated	  period	  of	  time,	  or	  results	  from	  a	  
particular	  challenge”	  (1992,	  p.	  2).	   The	  Society	  provides	  a	  basis	  for	  an	  analysis	  of	  risks	  associated	  
with	  hazards	  by	  measuring	  the	  likelihood	  and	  consequence	  of	  hazards	  in	  the	  community.	   How	  
one	  perceives	  the	  adverse	  impacts	  of	  risk	  either	  from	  an	  individual,	  organizational	  or	  societal	  
perspective	  certainly	  influences	  strategies	  to	  address	  the	  risk	  of	  natural	  hazards.	   Also,	  the	  
process	  used	  in	  the	  analysis	  will	  help	  to	  shape	  the	  individual	  and	  institutional	  approaches	  in	  
addressing	  risk.	   Although	  individuals,	  organizations	  and	  public	  policy	  positions	  may	  be	  viewed	  
differently,	  an	  open	  analysis	  of	  hazards	  is	  constructive	  in	  preparing	  a	  sound	  hazard	  risk	  
management	  policy	  and	  community	  hazard	  mitigation	  plans.	  
	  
Risks	  may	  be	  viewed	  as	  voluntary	  where	  we	  agree	  to	  participate	  in	  activities	  that	  increase	  our	  
chances	  of	  harm	  or	  injury	  including	  driving	  fast	  or	  participating	  in	  high	  risk	  sporting	  events.	  Other	  
risks	  that	  we	  do	  not	  choose	  to	  participate	  in	  are	  classified	  as	  involuntary	  risks	  where	  we	  
unknowingly	  or	  unwittingly	  are	  exposed	  to	  harm.	   For	  involuntary	  risks,	  one	  may	  be	  exposed	  
simply	  because	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  risk	  has	  changed	  as	  in	  a	  potential	  for	  wild-­‐land	  fire	  or	  a	  
hazardous	  material	  spill.	  	  Some	  communities	  may	  not	  appreciate	  the	  actual	  risk	  from	  some	  
hazards	  because	  they	  have	  adjusted	  to	  the	  threat	  presented	  by	  the	  hazard	  and	  not	  examined	  
alternatives	  that	  would	  reduce	  their	  vulnerability.	  
	  
The	  Royal	  Society	  Study	  Group	  acknowledges	  that	  risk	  management	  as	  a	  concept	  involves	  making	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decisions	  concerning	  risks	  and	  that	  this	  concerns	  both	  hazard	  identification	  and	  risk	  analysis.	  	  Our	  
use	  of	  the	  term	  risk	  analysis	  fits	  within	  this	  context	  and	  reflects	  our	  determination	  to	  understand	  
the	  likelihood	  of	  a	  hazard	  event	  and	  the	  consequences	  of	  the	  disaster	  on	  a	  community,	  region	  or	  
for	  an	  organization	  (1992).	   This	  definition	  of	  risk	  analysis	  comprises	  the	  identification	  of	  the	  
outcomes	  and	  estimations	  of	  the	  magnitude	  of	  the	  consequences	  and	  the	  probability	  of	  those	  
outcomes.	  Finally,	  organizations	  use	  the	  outcomes	  of	  risk	  analysis	  to	  determine	  what	  is	  an	  
acceptable	  level	  of	  risk	  and	  if	  anything	  can	  be	  done	  to	  reduce	  the	  adverse	  effects	  of	  the	  risk	  of	  a	  
specific	  hazard.	   The	  determination	  of	  risk	  reduction	  measures	  at	  an	  organizational	  level	  is	  
regarded	  as	  hazards	  risk	  management.	  
	  
Quantitative	  Analysis	  of	  Risk	  
	  
There	  are	  predominantly	  two	  categories	  of	  analysis:	  Quantitative	  Analyses	  and	  Qualitative	  
Analyses.	  Quantitative	  analysis	  uses	  statistical	  measures	  to	  derive	  numerical	  references	  of	  risk.	  
Qualitative	  analysis	  uses	  categorical	  variables	  in	  describing	  the	  likelihood	  and	  consequences	  of	  
risk.	  	  Quantitative	  analysis	  uses	  specific	  measurable	  indicators	  (whether	  dollars,	  probability,	  
frequency,	  or	  number	  of	  injuries/fatalities)	  while	  qualitative	  analysis	  uses	  qualifiers	  to	  
represent	  a	  range	  of	  possibilities.	  
	  
	   Quantitative	  Analysis	  of	  Likelihood	  
	  
Quantitative	  analysis	  of	  the	  likelihood	  component	  of	  risk	  seeks	  to	  find	  the	  numerical	  statistical	  
probability	  of	  the	  occurrence	  of	  a	  hazard	  causing	  a	  disaster.	   These	  analyses	  tend	  to	  be	  based	  
upon	  historical	  data.	  	  A	  standard	  for	  the	  numerical	  measurement	  for	  this	  likelihood	  of	  
occurrence	  must	  be	  established.	   One	  of	  the	  most	  commonly	  used	  quantitative	  measures	  of	  
likelihood	  is	  the	  number	  of	  times	  a	  particular	  hazard	  causes	  a	  disaster	  per	  year.	  For	  example,	  a	  
measure	  indicating	  the	  frequency	  of	  a	  hazard	  occurrence	  is	  3	  per	  year	  (3/year),	  would	  indicate	  
an	  historical	  average	  of	  3	  hazard	  events	  occurring	  annually.	  Other	  time	  frames	  may	  also	  be	  used	  
such	  as	  1/decade	  or	  10/week.	  	  An	  alternative	  technique	  for	  a	  quantitative	  measure	  of	  likelihood	  
is	  to	  express	  the	  frequency	  per	  time	  frame	  as	  a	  probability	  that	  reflects	  the	  same	  data,	  but	  
expresses	  the	  outcome	  as	  percentage	  between	  0%	  and	  100%.	   For	  example,	  a	  100-­‐-­‐-­‐year	  flood	  has	  
a	  1/100	  chance	  of	  occurring	  in	  any	  given	  year,	  or	  expressed	  as	  a	  probability	  1%	  or	  0.01,	  while	  a	  
hazard	  that	  occurs	  1/decade	  has	  a	  10%	  or	  0.1	  chance	  of	  occurring	  in	  a	  given	  year.	  We	  interpret	  
these	  probabilities	  based	  upon	  how	  close	  they	  are	  to	  0%,	  50%,	  or	  100%.	  For	  example,	  a	  0%	  
chance	  for	  occurrence	  indicates	  the	  hazard	  will	  not	  occur	  and	  a	  100%	  chance	  for	  occurrence	  
indicates	  the	  hazard	  is	  certain	  to	  occur	  in	  the	  specified	  time.	  The	  closer	  the	  percentage	  is	  to	  
100%	  the	  more	  likely	  it	  is	  to	  occur,	  while	  a	  50%	  chance	  indicates	  the	  hazard	  is	  equally	  likely	  to	  
occur	  as	  to	  not	  occur.	  	  
	  
	   Quantitative	  Analysis	  of	  Consequence	  
	  
As	  was	  true	  with	  the	  likelihood	  component	  of	  risk,	  the	  consequences	  of	  risk	  can	  also	  be	  
Pine,	  J.C.	  (2014).	  	  Hazards	  Analysis:	  Reducing	  the	  Impact	  of	  Disasters.	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described	  according	  to	  quantitative	  or	  qualitative	  reporting	  methods.	   The	  quantitative	  
representation	  of	  consequence	   can	  be	  represented	  by	  the	  number	  of	  deaths	  or	  injuries	  
or	  by	  estimating	  actual	  damages	  from	  various	  events.	  For	  example,	  the	  final	  death	  toll	  for	  
Hurricane	  Katrina	  was	  1,836	  and	  caused	  $81	  Billion	  in	  property	  damage	  (Zimmermann	  	  
2012).	  These	  quantitative	  measures	  are	  sometimes	  used	  to	  rank	  and	  compare	  disaster	  
events,	  such	  as	  the	  deadliest	  or	  most	  expensive.	  Figure	  5-­‐3	  	  (NOAA,	  NWS	  NHS	  47)	  shows	  
the	  deadliest	  hurricanes	  on	  record	  to	  hit	  the	  United	  States.	  
	  
	  
Figure	  5-­‐-­‐-­‐2:	  Deadliest	  U.S.	  Hurricanes	  
	  
Qualitative	  Analysis	  of	  Risk	  
	  
Qualitative	  Analysis	  of	  Likelihood	  
	  
Qualitative	  representation	  of	  likelihood	  uses	  words	  to	  describe	  the	  chance	  of	  an	  occurrence.	  
Each	  word,	  or	  phrase,	  will	  have	  a	  designated	  range	  of	  possibilities	  attached	  to	  it	  as	  illustrated	  in	  
the	  categories	  in	  Figure	  5-­‐-­‐-­‐3.	  
	  
	  
Figure	  5-­‐-­‐-­‐3:	  Qualitative	  Representation	  of	  Likelihood	  
	  
Individuals	  determine	  the	  risk	  of	  a	  specific	  hazard	  by	  making	  a	  judgment	  among	  these	  
Pine,	  J.C.	  (2014).	  	  Hazards	  Analysis:	  Reducing	  the	  Impact	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alternatives.	   We	  base	  these	  judgments	  on	  many	  factors,	  which	  could	  include	  our	  recent	  
experience,	  how	  hazards	  have	  affected	  others,	  information	  provided	  by	  the	  media	  and	  or	  
community	  meetings	  that	  may	  have	  addressed	  potential	  hazards.	  We	  may	  also	  convert	  a	  
calculated	  quantitative	  measure	  to	  a	  qualitative	  variable.	  For	  example,	  if	  it	  is	  calculated	  that	  there	  
is	  a	  1.5%	  chance	  of	  a	  wildfire	  in	  a	  specific	  area,	  then	  we	  would	  assign	  the	  categorical	  variable	  rare	  
to	  this	  event	  according	  to	  Figure	  5-­‐3.	  
	  
Qualitative	  Analysis	  of	  Consequence	  
	  
As	  was	  true	  with	  the	  qualitative	  representation	  of	  likelihood,	  words	  or	  phrases	  that	  have	  
associated	  meanings	  are	  used	  to	  describe	  the	  effects	  of	  a	  past	  disaster	  or	  the	  anticipated	  
effects	  of	  a	  future	  one.	  	  These	  measurements	  can	  be	  assigned	  to	  deaths,	  injuries,	  or	  costs	  
(oftentimes,	  the	  qualitative	  measurement	  of	  fatalities	  and	  injuries	  are	  combined).	   Figure	  5-­‐4	  
provides	  an	  illustration	  of	  the	  subjective	  ranges	  to	  help	  quantify	  the	  measurement	  indicator	  




Figure	  5-­‐4-­‐:	  Qualitative	  Consequence	  Indicators	  
	  
Critical	  Thinking:	  	  We	  attempt	  to	  understand	  risk	  using	  both	  quantitative	  and	  qualitative	  tools	  
that	  allow	  us	  to	  examine	  hazards	  and	  their	  impacts	  using	  both	  the	  physical	  and	  social	  sciences.	  	  
Not	  only	  is	  an	  understanding	  of	  risk	  shaped	  on	  an	  individual	  basis	  by	  the	  individual’s	  familiarity	  
with	  local	  hazards	  (Slovic	  1991)	  but	  also	  from	  elements	  of	  local	  culture	  that	  includes	  how	  
hazards	  have	  been	  viewed	  locally	  over	  time.	   For	  example,	  residents	  in	  the	  northeast	  seemed	  
relatively	  unprepared	  when	  hurricane	  Sandy	  struck	  the	  northeastern	  states	  in	  2012.	  	  However,	  
just	  one	  year	  after	  Sandy	  struck	  49%	  of	  the	  residents	  surveyed	  in	  New	  York	  and	  New	  Jersey	  
believed	  that	  Sandy	  made	  them	  more	  urgent	  and	  thorough	  in	  their	  hurricane	  preparedness	  
(Breslin	  2013).	  	  For	  hazards	  that	  are	  possible	  in	  your	  area,	  what	  influences	  your	  view	  of	  risk?	  




Views	  of	  Risk	  
	  
Rejeski	  (1993)	  notes	  that	  discussions	  of	  risk	  have	  included	  three	  primary	  groups	  including	  
scientists	  who	  form	  their	  opinions	  through	  a	  rational	  process,	  policy	  makers	  who	  establish	  their	  
perspectives	  based	  on	  multiple	  sources	  of	  information	  including	  quantitative	  and	  qualitative	  
data,	  and	  finally	  the	  public	  whose	  perceptions	  and	  judgments	  of	  risk	  are	  formed	  from	  their	  own	  
perspectives	  in	  some	  circumstances	  despite	  data	  provided	  by	  the	  other	  two	  major	  groups.	   He	  
observes	  that	  environmental	  risks	  and	  risk	  are	  full	  of	  ambiguities	  that	  may	  not	  be	  resolved	  
especially	  when	  interested	  groups	  have	  such	  different	  perspectives	  on	  the	  issues.	   He	  believes	  
that	  a	  common	  view	  of	  risk	  can	  only	  be	  obtained	  when	  groups	  agree	  to	  share	  their	  perceptions	  
and	  basis	  for	  their	  positions.	   He	  stresses	  that	  there	  is	  a	  great	  difference	  between	  uncertainty	  
and	  ambiguity.	  	  For	  ambiguity,	  there	  are	  intrinsic	  elements	  of	  public	  policy	  that	  separate	  risk	  
management	  strategies	  from	  the	  risk	  analysis	  process.	   One	  of	  the	  key	  elements	  in	  debates	  
concerning	  risk	  and	  uncertainty	  is	  the	  relative	  level	  of	  trust	  that	  is	  established	  between	  the	  three	  
groups,	  scientists,	  policy	  makers	  and	  the	  public.	   One	  possible	  option	  that	  may	  lead	  to	  a	  
consensus	  is	  to	  encourage	  a	  more	  participatory	  process	  and	  open	  dialogue.	  Utilizing	  tools	  to	  
visualize	  the	  data	  and	  scientific	  results	  concerning	  a	  hazard	  can	  provide	  a	  point	  of	  access	  into	  this	  
meaningful	  discussion.	  As	  an	  example,	  GIS	  provides	  a	  tool	  for	  examining	  both	  hazards	  and	  risk.	   It	  
can	  be	  used	  to	  visualize	  the	  nature	  and	  extent	  of	  a	  risk	  zone	  as	  shown	  in	  Figure	  5-­‐5.	  	  Three	  risk	  
zones	  are	  displayed	  in	  this	  simulation	  of	  a	  hazardous	  spill	  release	  as	  well	  as	  an	  additional	  zone	  
reflecting	  uncertainty.	   	   Unfortunately,	  this	  tool	  cannot	  solve	  the	  problem	  of	  disagreement	  but	  it	  
may	  enable	  those	  interested	  in	  the	  risks	  of	  hazards	  with	  the	  means	  of	  building	  a	  consensus.	  
	  
Figure	  5-­‐-­‐-­‐5:	  Hazard	  Risk	  Zones	  representing	  alternative	  exposure	  limit	  




To	  examine	  how	  hazard	  models	  and	  spatial	  analysis	  tools	  may	  address	  some	  issues,	  let’s	  
scrutinize	  the	  GIS	  example	  more	  closely.	  	  Figure	  5-­‐-­‐-­‐5	  provides	  an	  estimate	  of	  an	  accidental	  release	  
of	  Ammonia	  on	  a	  cool	  cloudy	  February	  day	  at	  10	  AM,	  the	  wind	  is	  assumed	  from	  the	  east	  at	  10	  
MPH.	   The	  release	  is	  assumed	  to	  occur	  near	  a	  hospital	  when	  a	  600-­‐pound	  tank	  drops	  from	  a	  truck	  
unloading	  a	  shipment	  of	  various	  cylinders.	   The	  model	  output	  provides	  three	  estimates	  of	  risk	  
using	  alternative	  exposure	  limits	  of	  25	  ppm,	  150	  ppm,	  and	  750	  ppm.	  The	  model	  shows	  areas	  
most	  vulnerable	  and	  provides	  an	  estimate	  of	  the	  exposure	  limits	  within	  these	  areas.	  This	  zoning	  
helps	  to	  clarify	  the	  spatial	  uncertainty	  inherent	  in	  such	  a	  disaster.	  The	  goal	  then	  is	  to	  more	  fully	  
understand	  the	  limitations	  of	  our	  hazard	  model	  and	  the	  data	  that	  is	  used	  in	  the	  spatial	  analysis	  
indicating	  the	  area	  of	  vulnerability.	   	  
	  
The	  three	  exposure	  limits	  for	  the	  scenario	  in	  Figure	  5-­‐-­‐-­‐5	  were	  drawn	  from	  Emergency	  Response	  
Planning	  Guidelines	  (ERPGs)	  which	  are	  used	  in	  the	  ALOHA	  chemical	  dispersion	  model	  to	  predict	  
the	  area	  where	  a	  toxic	  gas	  concentration	  might	  be	  high	  enough	  to	  harm	  people.	   A	  committee	  of	  
the	  American	  Industrial	  Hygiene	  Association	  developed	  three	  sets	  of	  exposure	  limits	  to	  toxic	  
chemicals	  for	  use	  as	  planning	  guidelines	  and	  to	  anticipate	  human	  adverse	  health	  effects	  caused	  
by	  exposure.	  The	  three-­‐-­‐-­‐tiered	  guideline,	  Figure	  5-­‐6,	  uses	  a	  one-­‐hour	  direct	  exposure	  duration.	  	  
Each	  guideline	  identifies	  the	  substance,	  its	  chemical	  and	  structural	  properties,	  animal	  toxicology	  
data,	  human	  experience,	  existing	  exposure	  guidelines,	  the	  rationale	  behind	  the	  selected	  value,	  
and	  a	  list	  of	  references.	  
	  
Understanding	  the	  limitations	  inherent	  in	  the	  model	  and	  guidelines	  described	  above	  is	  useful	  in	  
their	  application.	  First,	  the	  categories	  in	  these	  guidelines	  do	  not	  protect	  everyone.	  Very	  
sensitive	  individuals,	  including	  younger	  children	  and	  the	  elderly,	  might	  suffer	  adverse	  reactions	  
to	  concentrations	  far	  below	  those	  suggested	  in	  the	  guidelines.	   Further,	  these	  exposure	  limits	  
are	  primarily	  based	  on	  animal	  studies	  and	  not	  human	  studies.	  	   In	  addition,	  the	  exposure	  limits	  
are	  based	  on	  a	  one	  hour	  time	  period	  and	  do	  not	  account	  for	  any	  personal	  safety	  measures	  that	  
might	  be	  taken	  to	  reduce	  our	  exposure.	  	  	  The	  fact	  is	  that	  we	  might	  experience	  exposure	  for	  a	  
period	  longer	  than	  one	  hour	  but	  seek	  shelter	  at	  the	  initial	  signal	  of	  the	  release,	  thus	  subjecting	  
ourselves	  to	  less	  toxicity	  or	  harm	  than	  assumed	  in	  the	  guidelines.	  
	  
Critical	  Thinking:	  	  The	  question	  that	  the	  scenario	  of	  the	  accidental	  ammonia	  release	  presents	  
centers	  on	  our	  risk	  of	  harm	  for	  a	  specific	  exposure	  limit	  in	  a	  chemical	  release.	   The	  question	  of	  
risk	  in	  this	  case	  is	  not	  simple	  and	  depends	  on	  many	  factors	  such	  as	  where	  we	  are	  in	  the	  risk	  zone	  
(are	  we	  close	  or	  further	  away	  from	  the	  actual	  release),	  if	  we	  are	  inside	  a	  building	  or	  are	  exposed	  
in	  the	  outside	  environment,	  our	  individual	  health	  and	  if	  we	  suffer	  from	  asthma	  or	  other	  
breathing	  handicap,	  our	  age	  and	  physical	  size.	  	  How	  aware	  of	  potential	  risks	  in	  your	  area	  are	  
you?	  If	  you	  see	  the	  sign	  in	  Figure	  5-­‐7	  :	  NFPA	  Hazmat	  Diamond	  on	  the	  side	  of	  the	  building	  next	  to	  
you,	  how	  would	  you	  interpret	  it?	  	  Who	  it	  is	  meant	  to	  inform?	  	  
See	  http://www.compliancesigns.com/nfpadiamonds.shtml	  




Figure	  5-­‐-­‐-­‐6:	  Emergency	  Planning	  Guide	  Exposure	  Guidelines	  
	  
Figure	  5-­‐7:	  NFPA	  HAZMAT	  Diamond	  
	  
Using	  Historical	  Data	  in	  Determining	  Risk	  
	  
Whether	  we	  are	  determining	  parameter	  values	  for	  a	  hazard	  model	  or	  just	  trying	  to	  get	  a	  fix	  on	  
the	  vulnerability	  of	  a	  community	  to	  a	  specific	  hazard,	  risk	  experts	  turn	  to	  historical	  data	  to	  gain	  
Pine,	  J.C.	  (2014).	  	  Hazards	  Analysis:	  Reducing	  the	  Impact	  of	  Disasters.	  	  Taylor	  Francis	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insight	  and	  understanding.	  Complete	  data	  is	  normally	  not	  available	  as	  methods	  and	  resources	  for	  
collecting	  data	  have	  changed	  over	  time.	  However,	  even	  when	  it	  is	  known	  that	  a	  data	  set	  is	  
accurate,	  care	  must	  be	  taken	  when	  it	  is	  used.	  	  For	  example,	  losses	  following	  a	  disaster	  are	  often	  
measured	  in	  U.S.	  dollars.	  However,	  dollars	  in	  one	  country	  may	  have	  a	  different	  value	  than	  dollars	  
in	  a	  different	  country	  making	  comparisons	  between	  the	  impacts	  of	  disasters	  in	  different	  countries	  
problematic.	  	  
	  
Over	  time,	  our	  ability	  and	  the	  methods	  used	  to	  collect	  information	  on	  disasters	  have	  changed.	  
Scientific	  instruments	  are	  more	  sensitive	  and	  accurate	  than	  in	  the	  past.	  New	  technologies	  such	  as	  
satellites	  provide	  opportunities	  for	  collecting	  data	  that	  previously	  did	  not	  exist.	  Indeed,	  our	  
capacity	  to	  detect	  and	  accurately	  classify	  disasters	  since	  satellites	  have	  been	  in	  use	  means	  that	  
the	  frequency	  data	  since	  the	  1960’s	  may	  be	  far	  more	  accurate	  than	  the	  frequency	  data	  sets	  of	  the	  
early	  20th	  	   Century.	  	  As	  an	  example,	  our	  ability	  to	  accurately	  detect	  and	  classify	  earthquakes	  or	  
tropical	  cyclones	  today	  is	  far	  greater	  than	  ever	  before.	   Hence	  we	  have	  observed	  a	  dramatic	  
increase	  in	  disaster	  frequency	  in	  many	  data	  sets	  over	  the	  past	  twenty	  years.	  
	  
Numerous	  data	  sets	  reflecting	  the	  frequency	  of	  disasters	  and	  their	  consequences	  worldwide	  are	  
now	  available.	  These	  data	  sets	  may	  come	  from	  governing	  bodies,	  such	  as	  the	  United	  Nations,	  or	  
private	  companies	  such	  as	  Munich	  Reinsurance	  Company.	   The	  Centre	  for	  Research	  on	  the	  
Epidemiology	  of	  Disasters	  (CRED)	  at	  the	  University	  of	  Louvain,	  Belgium	  maintains	  one	  of	  the	  
largest	  datasets	  relating	  to	  disasters,	  Emergency	  Events	  Database	  (EM-­‐-­‐-­‐DAT).	  The	  EM-­‐DAT	  data	  
covers	  both	  natural	  and	  human	  caused	  disasters	  since	  1900.	  These	  data	  sets	  may	  be	  of	  value	  in	  
establishing	  a	  benchmark	  for	  a	  specific	  type	  of	  hazard	  that	  in	  turn	  may	  be	  adjusted	  for	  the	  same	  
hazard	  in	  a	  specific	  part	  of	  the	  world.	  For	  example,	  parameters	  established	  from	  landslide	  data	  
taken	  from	  communities	  in	  central	  Europe	  may	  need	  to	  be	  adjusted	  to	  specific	  soil	  layers	  and	  
building	  codes	  when	  applied	  to	  analyzing	  landslides	  in	  Africa.	   Weather	  related	  data	  obtained	  
from	  domestic	  sources	  such	  as	  the	  National	  Weather	  Service	  or	  NOAA	  may	  provide	  a	  more	  
accurate	  determination	  of	  specific	  risks	  of	  hazards	  in	  a	  specific	  part	  of	  the	  U.S.	  
	  
Figure	  5-­‐8	  shows	  centers	  for	  major	  natural	  hazard	  data	  sources.	  For	  the	  United	  States,	  the	  
National	  Climatic	  Data	  Center	  (NCDC)	  serves	  as	  a	  national	  resource	  for	  climate	  information.	  As	  a	  
climate	  resource,	  the	  NCDC	  works	  with	  scientists	  and	  researchers	  world-­‐-­‐-­‐wide.	  	  They	  provide	  both	  
national	  and	  global	  data	  sets	  for	  weather	  and	  climate	  information.	  In	  addition	  to	  the	  NDCD,	  the	  
USGS	  Center	  for	  the	  Integration	  of	  Natural	  Disaster	  Information	  is	  a	  clearinghouse	  for	  disaster	  
information	  and	  provides	  links	  to	  disaster	  data	  distributed	  by	  other	  agencies	  (Thomas	  2001).	   The	  
U.S.	  Environmental	  Protection	  Agency	  (EPA)	  and	  the	  U.S.	  Department	  of	  Transportation	  (DOT)	  
provide	  information	  on	  accidental	  releases	  of	  hazardous	  chemicals.	  	  The	  DOT	  focuses	  its	  data	  
collection	  on	  transportation	  accidental	  releases	  while	  EPA	  focuses	  its	  attention	  on	  fixed	  site	  
releases.	  Thomas	  (2001)	  notes	  that	  there	  has	  been	  some	  integration	  of	  hazard	  event	  data	  within	  
a	  single	  agency	  such	  as	  the	  National	  Weather	  Service	  (NWS),	  although	  he	  acknowledges	  that	  “a	  
true	  systematic	  integration	  of	  multiple	  types	  of	  hazard	  data	  currently	  does	  not	  exist	   (p.	  64).	  





Figure	  5-­‐-­‐-­‐8:	  Natural	  Hazard	  Data	  Sources	  with	  Time	  Covered	  
	  
The	  Need	  for	  Complete	  Accurate	  Data	  for	  Decision	  Making	  
	  
In	  order	  to	  reduce	  the	  adverse	  impacts	  of	  disasters,	  those	  involved	  in	  the	  hazards	  analysis	  process	  
must	  have	  accurate	  and	  timely	  information	  to	  support	  effective	  decision	  making.	  Information	  that	  
results	  from	  our	  hazard	  modeling	  exists	  to	  support	  this	  decision	  making	  process.	   Transparency	  
with	  regard	  to	  the	  information	  normally	  promotes	  confidence	  in	  the	  information	  and	  those	  who	  
provide	  it	  by	  the	  user.	  Showing	  transparency,	  includes	  revealing	  the	  sources	  of	  the	  data	  relied	  
upon,	  any	  errors	  found	  in	  the	  data,	  data	  that	  the	  expert	  chose	  to	  omit	  and	  why,	  and	  whether	  the	  
data	  was	  complete	  or	  incomplete.	  	  	  
	  
Since	  the	  data	  is	  used	  as	  input	  to	  hazard	  models	  or	  to	  find	  parameter	  values	  used	  in	  these	  
models,	  understanding	  its	  quality	  and	  accuracy	  is	  important.	  Inaccurate	  data	  or	  data	  with	  a	  large	  
amount	  of	  measurement	  uncertainty	  will	  result	  in	  an	  inaccurate	  model	  result	  or	  a	  large	  amount	  
of	  uncertainty	  in	  the	  model	  result.	  The	  saying	  among	  experts	  is	  “trash	  in,	  trash	  out.”	  Hence	  it	  is	  
important	  for	  the	  end	  user,	  the	  decision	  makers	  in	  this	  case,	  to	  know	  how	  much	  they	  should	  rely	  
upon	  the	  information	  given	  them.	  In	  the	  end,	  the	  information	  coming	  from	  this	  rather	  technical	  
report	  or	  complex	  hazard	  model	  must	  fit	  into	  a	  framework	  established	  for	  dealing	  with	  the	  
hazard.	  The	  data	  requirements	  for	  supporting	  the	  emergency	  management	  process	  will	  vary	  both	  
for	  the	  type	  of	  hazard	  as	  well	  as	  how	  the	  outputs	  will	  be	  utilized	  in	  supporting	  decision	  making	  
(Cutter	  2001).	  	  For	  example,	  suppose	  a	  village	  is	  seeking	  to	  mitigate	  and	  manage	  the	  affects	  of	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frequent	  landslides	  that	  plague	  the	  region.	  	  Accurate	  elevation,	  soil	  and	  water	  flow	  data	  is	  needed	  
to	  show	  high-­‐risk	  areas,	  as	  well	  as	  identifying	  past	  landslide	  areas.	  Community	  leaders	  may	  use	  
this	  data	  to	  write	  regulations	  indicating	  where	  building	  is	  prohibited	  and	  building	  codes	  for	  areas	  
where	  it	  is	  allowed.	  Inaccurate	  data	  could	  lead	  to	  regulations	  that	  do	  not	  provide	  sufficient	  
protection	  for	  businesses	  or	  families	  or	  possibly	  too	  much	  regulation	  that	  becomes	  an	  economic	  
hardship	  for	  expansion.	  	  	   	  
	  
Using	  Technical	  Data	  in	  Decision-­‐-­‐-­‐Making	  
	  
The	  description	  and	  categorization	  of	  hazard	  areas,	  critical	  infrastructure,	  and	  disaster	  zones	  is	  
greatly	  facilitated	  by	  the	  use	  of	  geospatial	  technologies	  and	  hazard	  models.	   The	  use	  of	  scientific	  
data	  from	  hazard	  models	  and	  risk	  analysis	  requires	  that	  decision	  makers	  fully	  understand	  the	  
limitations	  of	  these	  tools	  and	  how	  to	  communicate	  information.	   An	  informed	  user	  of	  complex	  
data	  is	  critical	  to	  minimizing	  legal	  challenges	  and	  law	  suits.	   Hazard	  models	  can	  provide	  different	  
results	  with	  just	  small	  changes	  in	  data	  inputs.	   Clarifying	  the	  model	  sensitivity	  to	  the	  inputs	  and	  
the	  limitations	  of	  the	  data	  used	  in	  the	  model	  will	  help	  to	  avoid	  challenges	  to	  the	  use	  of	  these	  
models	  in	  emergency	  management.	  
	  
Also,	  there	  may	  be	  a	  discrepancy	  between	  an	  objective	  assessment	  of	  risk	  by	  the	  hazards	  analysis	  
team	  and	  the	  public	  (Kirkwood	  1994).	   An	  objective	  view	  of	  risk	  by	  a	  knowledgeable	  professional	  
who	  understands	  the	  nature	  and	  limitations	  of	  hazard	  modeling	  and	  how	  it	  is	  described,	  may	  not	  
be	  shared	  by	  the	  public.	   An	  objective	  evaluation	  of	  risk	  must	  be	  non-­‐-­‐-­‐	  judgmental	  and	  explained	  in	  
a	  way	  that	  the	  public	  or	  other	  stakeholders	  can	  understand.	  	  
	  
The	  discrepancy	  between	  risk	  analysts	  and	  the	  public	  in	  their	  view	  of	  risk	  has	  been	  changing	  for	  
many	  hazards.	  For	  example,	  with	  satellite	  imagery,	  a	  storm	  can	  be	  tracked	  over	  long	  periods	  of	  
time	  and	  distances	  providing	  ample	  warning	  to	  those	  in	  its	  path.	  The	  radar	  image	  of	  the	  storm	  
and	  its	  motion	  through	  time	  provides	  a	  concrete	  way	  that	  experts	  can	  use	  to	  communicate	  the	  
hazard	  information	  to	  the	  public.	  	  However,	  when	  hazards	  occur	  infrequently,	  such	  as	  in	  the	  case	  
of	  volcanic	  eruptions,	  both	  experts	  and	  the	  public	  may	  be	  caught	  off	  its	  guard	  (USGS	  2012).	  	  In	  
1982,	  the	  eruption	  of	  El	  Chichón	  in	  Chiapas	  Mexico	  became	  North	  America’s	  most	  deadly	  volcano,	  
killing	  2,000	  within	  a	  radius	  of	  10	  km.	  Its	  last	  eruption	  had	  been	  about	  500	  years	  earlier.	  	  Its	  peak	  
appeared	  frosted	  and	  calm	  for	  dozens	  of	  generations.	  Even	  though	  there	  were	  seismic	  
precursors,	  hazard	  analysis	  for	  volcanic	  eruptions	  was	  and	  is	  still	  in	  its	  infancy.	  	  According	  to	  
Marzocchi	  and	  Woo	  (2009),	  since	  the	  1982	  eruption	  volcanic	  risk	  has	  been	  quantitatively	  defined	  
but	  not	  effectively	  measured.	  	  Their	  paper	  proposes	  a	  framework	  for	  volcanic	  risk	  metrics	  (VRM)	  
in	  an	  attempt	  to	  provide	  rules	  to	  local	  authorities	  for	  managing	  this	  risk.	  As	  challenging	  as	  it	  will	  
be	  to	  develop	  effective	  volcanic	  eruption	  risk	  management	  measurements,	  communicating	  this	  
risk	  to	  authorities	  and	  local	  inhabitants	  in	  the	  face	  of	  a	  peak	  that	  has	  been	  frosted	  for	  generations	  
will	  be	  even	  more	  difficult.	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Analysts	  and	  decision-­‐makers	  can	  find	  ways	  to	  leverage	  the	  increased	  power	  in	  modern	  
technology.	  As	  technology	  has	  increased	  and	  the	  speed	  and	  memory	  capacities	  of	  computers	  
grown,	  information	  can	  be	  stored	  and	  accessed	  more	  easily	  than	  in	  the	  past.	  Systems	  supporting	  
decision-­‐	  making	  activities	  from	  technical	  data	  have	  evolved.	  Today,	  decision	  support	  systems	  
(DSS)	  allow	  the	  software	  and	  the	  user	  to	  interact	  in	  a	  way	  to	  solve	  problems	  and	  make	  decisions	  
with	  the	  warehoused	  technical	  data.	  Indeed,	  Wallace	  and	  Balogh	  (1985)	  stress	  the	  need	  for	  
decision	  support	  systems	  (DSS)	  for	  using	  technical	  data.	  	  They	  stress	  a	  DSS	  must	  address	  the	  
following:	  
	  
 Provide	  support	  to	  decision	  makers	  and	  their	  stakeholders;	  
 Evolve	  as	  the	  users	  become	  more	  familiar	  with	  the	  technology;	  
 Be	  interactive	  and	  controllable;	  
 Recognize	  their	  non-­‐-­‐-­‐routine,	  but	  consequential	  use;	  and	  
 Adapt	  to	  the	  idiosyncrasies	  that	  are	  inherent	  in	  human	  decision	  making.	  
	  
Indicators	  of	  Direct	  and	  Indirect	  Losses	  
	  
We	  measure	  the	  consequences	  of	  disasters	  using	  indicators	  of	  disaster	  impacts.	   They	  could	  
include	  social	  disruption,	  economic	  disruption	  or	  environmental	  impacts.	   Social	  disruption	  
measures	  include	  the	  number	  of	  people	  displaced	  or	  made	  homeless	  and	  incident	  rates	  of	  
crime	  (murders,	  arrests	  for	  civil	  disorder,	  or	  fighting).	  Economic	  disruption	  measures	  include	  
unemployment	  rates,	  days	  of	  work	  lost,	  production	  volume	  lost,	  and	  decrease	  in	  sales	  or	  tax	  
income.	  	  Environmental	  impacts	  can	  be	  valued	  at	  total	  cleanup	  costs,	  costs	  of	  repair	  or	  
restoration	  of	  water	  or	  sewerage	  systems,	  the	  number	  of	  days	  of	  unhealthy	  air,	  or	  the	  number	  
of	  warnings	  involving	  fish	  consumption	  or	  restrictions	  on	  recreational	  use	  of	  a	  water	  feature.	  
Direct	  tangible	  losses	  such	  as	  fatalities,	  injuries,	  cost	  of	  repair,	  loss	  of	  inventory,	  response	  
costs	  by	  a	  business	  or	  community,	  or	  relocation	  costs	  are	  first	  order	  consequences	  that	  occur	  
immediately	  after	  an	  event	  (Smith	  2004).	   Indirect	  losses	  associated	  with	  a	  disaster	  evolve	  
after	  the	  event	  and	  include	  loss	  of	  income	  by	  displaced	  employees,	  sales	  that	  did	  not	  occur,	  
increased	  costs	  for	  skilled	  employees,	  losses	  in	  productivity	  of	  employees,	  employee	  sickness,	  
increases	  in	  disruptive	  behavior	  (fights)	  at	  schools	  or	  crime	  in	  a	  neighborhood.	  
	  
The	  indicators	  for	  social,	  economic	  or	  environmental	  impacts	  may	  be	  based	  on	  historical	  data	  
and	  collection	  of	  data	  after	  a	  disaster	  event	  or	  modeling	  techniques.	   To	  estimate	  the	  impact	  on	  
the	  population	  in	  a	  disaster	  zone	  using	  historical	  data,	  one	  would	  determine	  from	  past	  disasters	  
the	  number	  of	  injuries,	  fatalities,	  displaced	  persons,	  and	  those	  requiring	  shelter	  or	  left	  
unemployed.	   In	  order	  to	  measure	  the	  relative	  impact	  of	  the	  disaster,	  the	  population	  size	  and	  
economic	  data	  need	  to	  be	  known	  before	  and	  after	  the	  event.	  For	  example,	  a	  rate	  comparing	  the	  
number	  of	  injuries	  for	  the	  total	  population	  would	  provide	  a	  means	  of	  comparing	  injuries	  at	  
different	  disaster	  events	  allowing	  for	  population	  changes	  over	  time.	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Allowing	  for	  population	  changes	  over	  time	  does	  not	  account	  for	  other	  related	  changes	  that	  could	  
impact	  injuries,	  fatalities	  and	  indicators	  for	  disaster	  impacts.	   Significant	  errors	  can	  result	  when	  
projecting	  past	  disaster	  consequences	  forward	  based	  solely	  upon	  projected	  population	  changes.	  
The	  impacts	  from	  more	  recent	  disaster	  events	  may	  reflect	  legal	  changes	  (code	  requirements	  or	  
flood	  plain	  management	  programs),	  changes	  in	  development	  patterns,	  or	  cultural	  and	  social	  
changes	  causing	  movement	  in	  populated	  areas.	  
	  
The	  use	  of	  measurable	  indicators	  to	  help	  understand	  risks	  could	  be	  enhanced	  if	  all	  of	  the	  
indicators	  used	  the	  same	  units	  of	  measure	  or	  the	  same	  reference	  points.	   An	  example	  would	  be	  
to	  quantify	  deaths,	  injuries,	  and	  damages	  in	  a	  common	  measure	  such	  as	  U.S.	  dollars.	  
Unfortunately,	  it	  may	  be	  impossible	  to	  associate	  a	  dollar	  amount	  to	  some	  indicators.	   The	  
alternative	  is	  to	  use	  measurable	  indicators	  that	  may	  be	  compared	  over	  time.	  As	  an	  example,	  
consider	  the	  indicators	  used	  when	  assessing	  population	  vulnerability	  to	  disasters.	  It	  is	  often	  the	  
case	  that	  countries	  with	  high	  poverty	  levels	  show	  increased	  vulnerability	  to	  many	  natural	  
hazards.	  This	  increased	  vulnerability	  can	  by	  attributed	  to	  lack	  of	  resources	  for	  planning	  and	  
reduced	  government	  enforcement	  of	  codes	  and	  restrictions.	  	  The	  World	  Bank	  classifies	  each	  
national	  economy	  by	  its	  gross	  national	  income	  (GNI)	  per	  capita,	  to	  reveal	  low	  income,	  middle	  
income	  and	  high-­‐income	  countries	   (ISDR	  Secretariat	  2003).	   A	  more	  complex	  measure	  of	  
population	  vulnerability	  is	  provided	  by	  the	  United	  Nations	  in	  its	  Human	  Development	  Index	  (HDI)	  
that	  uses	  life	  expectancy,	  educational	  attainment	  and	  income	  as	  indicators	  of	  sustainability.	  
	  
Intangible	  losses	  are	  those	  that	  cannot	  be	  expressed	  in	  universally	  accepted	  financial	  terms	  and	  
are	  not	  generally	  included	  in	  damage	  assessments	  or	  predictions.	   Despite	  the	  difficulty	  in	  
associating	  some	  intangible	  losses	  to	  specific	  indicators,	  we	  may	  want	  to	  identify	  some	  type	  of	  
indicator	  that	  reflects	  the	  losses	  associated	  with	  cultural	  changes,	  individual	  and	  family	  stress,	  
mental	  illness,	  sentimental	  value	  and	  environmental	  losses.	   We	  need	  to	  identify	  appropriate	  
measures	  of	  both	  tangible	  and	  intangible	  losses	  associated	  with	  disasters.	   It	  is	  not	  uncommon	  
for	  the	  intangible	  impacts	  to	  exceed	  the	  tangible	  ones	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  overall	  effect	  they	  have	  
on	  a	  community	  (UNDP	  2006).	  
	  
As	  we	  examine	  potential	  losses	  from	  disasters,	  we	  may	  find	  that	  the	  community	  or	  business	  
organization	  actually	  has	  gains.	   Though	  it	  is	  extremely	  rare	  for	  gains	  to	  be	  included	  in	  the	  
assessment	  of	  past	  disasters	  or	  the	  prediction	  of	  future	  ones,	  it	  is	  undeniable	  that	  benefits	  can	  
exist	  in	  the	  aftermath	  of	  disaster	  events.	   Gains	  could	  be	  observed	  in	  increases	  in	  employment,	  
business	  volume,	  tax	  collections,	  or	  the	  number	  of	  residents,	  or	  decreases	  in	  the	  volume	  of	  
traffic	  or	  crime	  rates.	   Post	  Hurricane	  Katrina	  data	  shows	  that	  many	  cities	  within	  a	  100	  mile	  
distance	  of	  the	  City	  of	  New	  Orleans	  had	  positive	  gains	  from	  the	  displacement	  of	  the	  
metropolitan	  New	  Orleans	  population.	   Although	  the	  impacts	  were	  temporary,	  some	  gains	  
remained	  even	  years	  after	  the	  disaster.	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Critical	  Thinking:	  	  How	  might	  you	  measure	  the	  intangible	  losses	  related	  to	  the	  impact	  of	  a	  
disaster	  in	  an	  education	  system	  that	  has	  to	  accommodate	  an	  increase	  of	  25%	  more	  students	  or	  
increases	  in	  traffic	  in	  a	  community	  that	  absorbed	  40%	  more	  residents	  who	  have	  been	  displaced?	  
	  
Issues	  in	  Risk	  Analysis	  
	  
Changes	  in	  Disaster	  Frequency	  
	  
Changes	  in	  disaster	  frequency	  may	  be	  the	  natural	  result	  of	  climatic	  variations	  that	  occur	  over	  a	  
long	  time	  intervals	  or	  from	  changes	  in	  factors	  that	  impact	  the	  frequency	  or	  severity	  of	  an	  
environmental	  change	  such	  as	  an	  increase	  in	  human	  activity	  where	  the	  hazard	  already	  exists.	  	  	  
The	  number	  of	  hurricanes	  that	  enter	  the	  Gulf	  of	  Mexico	  varies	  over	  a	  long	  period,	  especially	  with	  
the	  rise	  or	  fall	  of	  sea	  surface	  temperatures	  or	  wind	  patterns	  from	  an	  El	  Niño.	   Flooding	  or	  
hurricane	  storm	  surge	  might	  cause	  more	  physical	  damage	  because	  of	  increased	  development	  in	  
coastal	  areas	  (Smith	  2004).	  	  The	  trend	  in	  population	  shifts	  to	  high	  hazard	  coastal	  zones	  will	  likely	  
result	  in	  higher	  losses	  from	  tropical	  cyclones.	   Environmental	  changes	  resulting	  in	  natural	  system	  
degradation	  may	  also	  increase	  the	  severity	  of	  hazards.	   As	  infrastructure	  is	  added	  and	  more	  
buildings	  are	  constructed,	  the	  potential	  for	  hazard	  impacts	  increases.	  With	  changes	  in	  technology,	  
people	  expect	  to	  have	  access	  to	  a	  certain	  level	  of	  services,	  including	  availability	  of	  water,	  
electricity,	  and	  easy	  long-­‐-­‐-­‐distance	  transportation.	   As	  these	  systems	  expand	  and	  develop	  they	  
become	  more	  vulnerable	  to	  hazards.	   Major	  blackouts,	  the	  spread	  of	  computer	  viruses,	  or	  
communication	  of	  terrorist	  threats	  have	  occurred	  worldwide	  in	  the	  past	  and	  will	  likely	  occur	  in	  
the	  future.	  	   The	  Interdependence	  of	  our	  societies	  globally	  contributes	  to	  our	  increasing	  
vulnerability	  to	  epidemics	  and	  disease.	  This	  interdependence	  also	  increases	  our	  economic	  
vulnerability.	  For	  example,	  when	  Greece	  defaulted	  on	  its	  government	  debt	  in	  2012,	  there	  were	  
major	  political	  and	  economic	  ramifications	  within	  and	  outside	  of	  the	  European	  Union.	  Natural	  
resources	  such	  as	   oil,	  water,	  and	  air	  quality	  are	  increasingly	  being	  recognized	  as	  threatened	  from	  
human	  activity.	  To	  understand	  these	  changes	  in	  disaster	  severity	  and	  frequency	  and	  its	  causes	  
trends	  may	  need	  to	  be	  examined	  over	  longer	  periods	  of	  time	  than	  the	  current	  data	  reflect.	  	  
Hence,	  the	  continued	  measurement	  and	  collection	  of	  data	  is	  needed	  to	  help	  risk	  experts	  
understand	  the	  natural	  variation	  of	  specific	  hazards	  and	  the	  impacts	  they	  will	  have	  in	  an	  
increasingly	  complex	  and	  interdependent	  society.	  
	  
Availability	  of	  Essential	  Data	  	  
	  
The	  availability	  of	  essential	  data	  for	  modeling	  hazards	  and	  determining	  the	  frequency	  of	  
occurrence	  is	  critical	  in	  a	  valid	  risk	  analysis.	   This	  essential	  data	  comes	  from	  both	  historical	  data,	  
as	  previously	  discussed,	  as	  well	  as	  measurements	  and	  data	  taken	  in	  real	  time.	  	  Examining	  the	  
management	  of	  flood	  hazards	  illustrates	  how	  the	  availability	  of	  historical	  and	  real	  time	  data	  is	  
used	  when	  attempting	  to	  understand	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  risk	  presented	  by	  a	  natural	  hazard.	  
	  
The	  National	  Flood	  Insurance	  Program	  (NFIP)	  was	  established	  in	  1968	  and	  made	  affordable	  flood	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insurance	  rates	  to	  individuals	  through	  participating	  local	  communities	  such	  as	  towns,	  cities,	  
counties	  or	  parishes.	  	  In	  1983	  a	  common	  standard	  for	  risk	  assessment	  and	  management	  of	  flood	  
hazards	  was	  adopted	  by	  federal	  agencies	  and	  known	  as	  the	  100	  year	  event	  or	  one	  percent	  annual	  
chance	  of	  flood	  as	  the	  standard	  for	  floodplain	  management.	   This	  standard	  was	  considered	  to	  
represent	  a	  degree	  of	  risk	  and	  damage	  worth	  protecting	  against,	  but	  was	  not	  considered	  to	  
impose	  excessive	  burdens	  or	  cost	  to	  property	  owners.	   The	  100-­‐-­‐-­‐year	  event	  standard	  represents	  a	  
compromise	  between	  minor	  floods	  and	  the	  greatest	  flood	  likely	  to	  occur	  in	  a	  given	  area.	  In	  many	  
cases	  the	  100-­‐-­‐-­‐year	  flood	  level	  is	  less	  than	  the	  highest	  recorded	  flood.	  	  
	  
As	  part	  of	  its	  role	  in	  floodplain	  management,	  this	  1-­‐-­‐-­‐	  percent	  annual	  chance	  of	  flood	  is	  used	  to	  
determine	  the	  need	  for	  flood	  insurance.	   Further,	  the	  development	  of	  flood	  models	  and	  flood	  
maps	  was	  considered	  by	  the	  NFIP	  as	  a	  primary	  means	  of	  reducing	  flood	  hazards.	   The	  flood	  maps	  
would	  provide	  a	  basis	  for	  managing	  the	  development	  and	  use	  of	  flood	  prone	  areas	  and	  lead	  to	  a	  
better	  understanding	  of	  the	  magnitude	  and	  likelihood	  of	  large	  flows.	  	  As	  federal	  agencies	  
enhanced	  their	  efforts	  to	  assist	  in	  flood	  mapping	  for	  communities	  joining	  the	  NFIP,	  information	  
on	  water	  feature	  flow	  frequencies	  grew	  in	  importance.	   In	  2002,	  The	  U.S.	  Water	  Resources	  
Council	  published	  a	  report	  describing	  flood	  regionalization	  techniques	  used	  in	  the	  National	  Flood	  
Frequency	  Program	  (NFF),	  (Ries	  and	  Crouse	  2002;	  Benson	  1967).	  	  These	  techniques	  were	  adopted	  
by	  USWRC	  for	  use	  in	  all	  Federal	  planning	  involving	  water	  and	  related	  land	  resources.	  
	  
All	  flood	  modeling	  programs	  that	  are	  used	  to	  create	  flood	  maps	  for	  local	  communities	  need	  a	  
discharge	  value	  for	  a	  water	  feature,	  such	  as	  a	  stream,	  canal,	  lake,	  or	  reservoir.	   The	  discharge	  
value	  is	  determined	  by	  measuring	  flow	  rates	  directly	  by	  the	  USGS	  through	  a	  river	  gage	  or	  
indirectly	  by	  statistical	  methods.	  	  A	  USGS	  River	  Gage	  Station	  measures	  a	  water	  feature’s	  discharge	  
at	  particular	  site.	  	  Figure	  5-­‐9	  shows	  the	  locations	  of	  the	  gage	  stations.	  For	  these	  stations,	  data	  is	  
collected	  on	  a	  real-­‐-­‐-­‐time	  basis	  by	  automated	  instrumentation	  and	  analyzed	  quickly	  enough	  to	  
influence	  a	  decision	  that	  affects	  the	  monitored	  system.	  The	  discharge	  measured	  at	  the	  gaged	  
sites	  characterizes	  the	  volume	  of	  water	  passing	  a	  point	  of	  the	  river	  gage	  station	  and	  is	  commonly	  
expressed	  in	  a	  hydrologic	  unit	  per	  unit	  of	  time,	  such	  as	  cubic	  feet	  per	  second,	  million	  gallons	  per	  
day,	  gallons	  per	  minute,	  or	  seconds	  per	  minute	  per	  day.	  	  





Figure	  5-­‐-­‐-­‐9:	  USGS	  River	  Gauges	  in	  the	  U.S.	  
Go	  to	  http://water.usgs.gov/waterwatch	   to	  review	  active	  state	  stations	  
	  
The	  table	  or	  graphical	  representation	  of	  the	  discharge	  data	  over	  a	  specific	  time	  period	  is	  called	  a	  
hydrograph.	  It	  provides	  real	  time	  and	  historical	  values.	  Figure	  5-­‐-­‐-­‐10:	  USGS	  Hydrograph	  for	  a	  water	  
feature	  provides	  an	  example	  of	  a	  hydrograph	  at	  a	  site	  that	  has	  a	  USGS	  river	  gage.	  For	  examples	  of	  
real	  time	  hydrographs	  see	  the	  following	  USGS	  Internet	  site:	  
http://cfpub.epa.gov/surf/locate/index.cfm.	  	  For	  ungaged	  areas,	  the	  NFF	  program	  produces	  
estimates	  of	  the	  magnitude	  and	  frequency	  of	  flood-­‐peak	  discharges	  as	  well	  as	  the	  corresponding	  
flood	  runoff	  hydrographs.	  The	  estimates	  for	  ungaged	  areas	  are	  based	  upon	  statistical	  methods	  
using	  regression	  equations.	  The	  estimates	  are	  used	  in	  flood-­‐plain	  management,	  flood-­‐control	  and	  
the	  design	  of	  different	  structures	  used	  in	  these	  areas.	  (Ries	  and	  Crouse	  2002)	  





Figure	  5-­‐-­‐-­‐10:	  USGS	  Hydrograph	  for	  a	  water	  feature.	  
	  
Depth	  of	  Analysis	  
	  
Each	  hazard	  that	  is	  analyzed	  must	  be	  considered	  according	  to	  the	  range	  of	  possible	  intensities	  
that	  could	  be	  exhibited	  by	  the	  particular	  hazard.	   Depending	  on	  the	  hazard,	  we	  may	  need	  to	  
examine	  it	  based	  on	  its	  intensity	  since	  the	  frequency	  of	  occurrence	  is	  so	  rare.	  
	  
We	  generally	  see	  that	  lower	  intensity	  hazard	  events	  occur	  more	  often	  than	  more	  severe	  ones	  as	  
in	  the	  case	  of	  a	  hurricane	  or	  an	  earthquake.	  	   More	  hazard	  events	  provide	  more	  data	  that	  can	  be	  
broken	  down	  into	  more	  classes.	  This	  increased	  granularity	  allows	  for	  a	  more	  comprehensive	  
assessment.	   We	  can	  thus	  determine	  a	  broad	  based	  frequency	  by	  calculating	  the	  likelihood	  of	  
each	  identified	  hazard	  broken	  down	  by	  magnitude	  or	  intensity,	  if	  appropriate.	  Likewise,	  the	  
consequences	  that	  are	  expected	  to	  occur	  for	  each	  hazard	  can	  be	  calculated	  and	  broken	  down	  by	  
magnitude	  or	  intensity	  if	  appropriate.	  Finally,	  a	  locally	  tailored	  qualitative	  system	  for	  each	  hazard	  
identified	  as	  threatening	  to	  the	  community	  can	  be	  produced.	  The	  qualitative	  measures	  may	  be	  
determined	  from	  the	  quantitative	  calculations	  as	  described	  above	  or	  at	  least	  should	  reflect	  them.	  	  
	  
In	  calculating	  the	  consequences	  as	  described	  above,	  damage	  resulting	  from	  past	  major	  disaster	  
events	  may	  form	  the	  basis	  for	  examining	  the	  impacts	  of	  future	  disasters.	   The	  massive	  floods	  of	  
1993	  or	  hurricanes	  such	  as	  Andrew	  (1992)	  or	  Katrina	  (2005)	  could	  provide	  a	  basis	  for	  estimating	  
damages	  in	  similar	  future	  floods	  or	  storms.	  However,	  estimates	  must	  be	  adjusted	  for	  local	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characteristics.	  For	  example,	  levy	  failure	  caused	  much	  of	  the	  flooding	  in	  New	  Orleans	  due	  to	  
Katrina.	  Hence,	  with	  improved	  levy	  conditions	  and	  changes	  made	  in	  the	  location	  of	  future	  
structures,	  the	  damage	  estimates	  from	  past	  data	  would	  need	  to	  be	  adjusted	  to	  reflect	  these	  
changes	  for	  future	  estimates.	  Also,	  estimates	  for	  the	  cost	  of	  damages	  from	  future	  landslides	  in	  
one	  region	  may	  differ	  greatly	  from	  a	  similar	  site	  in	  a	  different	  region	  due	  to	  the	  specific	  location	  
of	  local	  structures	  relative	  to	  the	  landslide	  risk,	  local	  building	  code	  differences,	  and	  differences	  in	  
local	  planning.	  Note	  that	  inflation	  factors	  may	  need	  to	  be	  used	  to	  help	  us	  project	  damages	  from	  
one	  time	  period	  to	  another.	  
	  
For	  major	  weather	  related	  events,	  granularity	  in	  the	  data	  may	  be	  difficult	  to	  achieve	  for	  small	  
regions.	  The	  bulk	  of	  the	  data	  may	  be	  available	  for	  large	  areas	  rather	  than	  smaller	  ones.	  
Unfortunately	  for	  most	  hazards,	  sufficient	  information	  does	  not	  exist	  to	  accurately	  quantify	  the	  
likelihood	  of	  a	  future	  occurrence	  of	  the	  disaster	  to	  a	  high	  degree	  of	  confidence.	   This	  is	  especially	  
true	  for	  those	  occurring	  infrequently	  or	  those	  occurring	  in	  no	  apparent	  pattern	  such	  as	  
earthquakes,	  droughts,	  terrorism,	  or	  nuclear	  accidents.	  
	  




For	  quantitative	  data,	  the	  relative	  ranking	  of	  risk	  can	  be	  obtained	  by	  numerical	  calculation.	  We	  
have	  seen	  that	  certain	  risks	  may	  be	  quantified	  by	  the	  numerical	  formula	  𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦×
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒.	  Hence,	  for	  a	  list	  of	  local	  hazards	  that	  are	  quantifiable	  numerically,	  their	  relative	  
risks	  can	  be	  ranked	  and	  compared.	  The	  EPA	  uses	  this	  type	  of	  relative	  ranking	  of	  risk	  in	  their	  
assessment	  of	  the	  inland	  waterways	  oil	  spill	  hazard.	  	  In	  (Etkin	  2006),	  this	  risk	  is	  assessed	  in	  
aggregate	  and	  relative	  to	  oil	  type,	  EPA	  region,	  and	  transportation	  mode.	  For	  example,	  consider	  
the	  assessment	  of	  risk	  of	  inland	  waterways	  spills	  by	  oil	  type	  as	  shown	  in	  Figure	  5-­‐11.	  Etkin	  
provides	  the	  following	  data	  summary:	  	  
	  
Figure	  5-­‐-­‐-­‐11:	  Risk	  of	  inland	  waterway	  oil	  spills	  by	  oil	  type	  




From	  this	  assessment	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  the	  greatest	  risk	  across	  oil	  types	  and	  EPA	  regions	  is	  from	  
crude	  oil.	  Crude	  oil	  spills	  cost	  less	  per	  gallon,	  but	  the	  relative	  average	  size	  of	  the	  spills	  are	  large.	  
Even	  though	  there	  are	  many	  more	  light	  fuel	  spills	  and	  their	  average	  cost	  per	  gallon	  is	  higher,	  the	  
spill	  volume	  is	  about	  five	  times	  less	  than	  the	  average	  crude	  oil	  spill	  volume,	  lessening	  the	  overall	  
measure	  of	  consequence	  for	  light	  fuel	  spills	  relative	  to	  crude	  oil	  spills.	  Hence,	  in	  using	  this	  analysis	  
one	  may	  be	  led	  to	  focus	  on	  reducing	  the	  number	  and	  size	  of	  crude	  oil	  spills	  to	  reduce	  the	  overall	  
risk.	  However,	  Etkin	  also	  performs	  a	  trend	  analysis	  that	  shows	  that	  the	  proportion	  of	  oil	  spills	  that	  
are	  light	  fuel	  spills	  are	  increasing	  sharply	  relative	  to	  other	  types	  of	  oil	  spills.	  This	  indicates	  the	  
need	  to	  also	  focus	  on	  reducing	  the	  number	  of	  light	  oil	  spills	  to	  mitigate	  future	  overall	  risk	  
increases.	  	  
	  
Likelihood	  -­‐	  Consequence	  Matrix	  
	  
Risk	  evaluation	  involves	  the	  determination	  of	  the	  relative	  seriousness	  of	  the	  risk	  of	  a	  hazard	  as	  
they	  could	  affect	  an	  organization	  or	  a	  local	  community.	   Organizations	  and	  communities	  face	  a	  
range	  of	  natural	  and	  technological	  hazards,	  each	  of	  which	  requires	  a	  different	  strategy	  to	  reduce	  
the	  risk	  factors	  of	  likelihood	  or	  consequence.	   To	  facilitate	  the	  relative	  ranking	  of	  risks	  
organizations	  should	  determine	  if	  a	  risk	  may	  be	  addressed	  by	  another	  agency;	  identify	  which	  risks	  
require	  immediate	  attention;	  and	  clarify	  if	  the	  risk	  associated	  with	  a	  hazard	  requires	  further	  
evaluation	  (Cameron	  2002).	  
	  
We	  can	  determine	  the	  relative	  ranking	  of	  risks	  associated	  with	  hazards	  facing	  our	  organization	  or	  
community	  by	  considering	  the	  following	  factors:	  
	  
• The	  likelihood	  and	  consequences	  of	  the	  hazard;	  	  	  
• The	  voluntary	  or	  involuntary	  nature	  of	  the	  risk	  (Smith	  2004);	  	  	  	  
• Is	  there	  a	  benefit	  to	  cost	  ratios	  of	  mitigating	  different	  risks;	  	  
• Are	  there	  political	  and	  social	  ramifications	  of	  certain	  mitigation	  decisions.	  
	  
The	  final	  output	  of	  risk	  evaluation	  is	  a	  prioritized	  list	  of	  risks,	  which	  will	  be	  used	  to	  decide	  
treatment	  (mitigation)	  options.	  
	  
In	  assessing	  risk,	  the	  first	  step	  is	  to	  identify	  the	  hazards	  of	  interest.	  We	  next	  assess	  the	  hazard	  for	  
its	  level	  of	  likelihood	  and	  the	  impact	  or	  intensity	  of	  its	  consequence.	  We	  use	  quantitative	  values	  
when	  possible.	  However,	  in	  order	  to	  apply	  the	  risk	  assessment	  matrix	  method	  for	  ranking	  risks,	  
the	  likelihood	  and	  consequence	  variables	  must	  be	  categorical.	  Hence	  hazards	  that	  are	  known	  to	  
exhibit	  a	  numerical	  range	  of	  likelihood	  and	  intensity	  values	  are	  assigned	  categorical	  values	  across	  
the	  range	  of	  possibilities.	   Assigning	  these	  levels	  to	  likelihood	  and	  consequence	  allows	  for	  a	  direct	  
comparison	  of	  the	  risks	  faced	  by	  a	  community.	  
	  
It	  is	  common	  to	  use	  four	  or	  five	  categorical	  values	  for	  the	  probability	  of	  occurrence.	  A	  summary	  of	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five	  values	  and	  their	  description	  as	  given	  in	  the	  Army	  ROTC	  risk	  management	  worksheet	  is	  shown	  
below	  (Army	  ROTC).	  In	  these	  descriptions,	  it	  is	  assumed	  that	  a	  time	  horizon	  is	  specified.	  The	  
parenthetical	  values	  shown	  are	  also	  used.	  
	  
Frequent	  –	  occurs	  often,	  continuously	  experienced;	  
Likely	  –	  Occurs	  several	  times;	  
Occasional	  (possible)	  –	  occurs	  sporadically;	  
Seldom	  (rare)	  –	  unlikely,	  but	  could	  occur	  at	  some	  time.	  
Unlikely	  –	  can	  assume	  it	  will	  not	  occur.	  
	  
Values	  are	  also	  assigned	  to	  the	  severity	  describing	  the	  expected	  consequence	  of	  the	  event	  in	  
terms	  of	  degree	  of	  injury,	  property	  damage	  or	  other	  impairments	  to	  the	  organization	  or	  
community	  doing	  the	  assessment.	  The	  summary	  below	  uses	  the	  terms	  as	  specified	  in	  the	  Army	  
ROTC	  	  worksheet	  with	  alternative	  values	  defined	  earlier	  for	  injury	  and	  death	  shown	  
parenthetically.	  
	  
Catastrophic	  –	  death	  or	  permanent	  and	  total	  disability,	  complete	  system	  loss,	  	  major	  
damage	  or	  significant	  property	  damage,	  mission	  (organization)	  failure	  (or	  complete	  
community	  disruption);	  
Critical	  (major)	  –	  permanent	  partial	  disability,	  temporary	  disability	  in	  excess	  of	  3	  months,	  
major	  system	  damage	  or	  significant	  property	  damage,	  significant	  mission	  (organization	  or	  
community)	  disruption;	  
Marginal	  (moderate)	  –	  Minor	  injuries,	  lost	  workday	  accident,	  minor	  system	  damage,	  
minor	  property	  damage,	  some	  mission	  (organization	  or	  community)	  disruption;	  
Negligible	  (minor)	  –	  first	  aid	  or	  minor	  medical	  treatment,	  minor	  system	  impairment,	  little	  
or	  no	  impact	  to	  the	  mission	  accomplishment	  (organization	  or	  community).	  
	  
As	  seen	  in	  Figure	  5-­‐11,	  once	  the	  values	  have	  been	  assigned	  for	  the	  identified	  hazards,	  we	  can	  
then	  summarize	  the	  likelihood	  and	  consequence	  for	  the	  risks	  associated	  with	  each	  hazard	  in	  the	  
first	  column	  using	  the	  risk	  description	  category.	  




Figure	  5-­‐12:	  Likelihood	  Consequence	  Matrix	  




To	  compare	  hazards,	  the	  values	  in	  the	  fourth	  column	  can	  be	  determined	  through	  the	  use	  of	  a	  risk	  
matrix.	  	  A	  risk	  matrix	  plots	  the	  likelihood	  and	  consequence	  of	  hazards	  together	  in	  various	  
combinations,	  with	  one	  risk	  component	  falling	  on	  the	  X-­‐-­‐-­‐axis	  and	  the	  other	  on	  the	  Y-­‐-­‐-­‐axis,	  similar	  to	  
how	  a	  multiplication	  table	  is	  laid	  out.	  	  By	  plotting	  these	  values	  on	  the	  matrix,	  individual	  boxes	  
representing	  unique	  combinations	  of	  likelihood	  and	  consequence	  can	  be	  determined.	  Each	  
hazard	  listed	  in	  the	  likelihood-­‐consequence	  matrix	  can	  then	  be	  placed	  in	  the	  box	  of	  the	  risk	  matrix	  
that	  best	  reflects	  its	  risk.	  	  
	  
Figure	  5-­‐-­‐-­‐13	  provides	  a	  risk	  matrix	  for	  assessing	  the	  likelihood	  and	  consequences	  of	  risks	  
presented	  by	  natural	  hazards.	  The	  labeling	  of	  the	  boxes	  with	  the	  risk	  categories,	  extreme,	  high,	  
moderate,	  and	  low	  may	  vary	  with	  the	  organization.	  In	  Figure	  5-­‐13	  the	  classifications	  as	  defined	  by	  
the	  Emergency	  Management	  Australia	  (EMA)	  are	  used.	  The	  cells	  down	  and	  just	  above	  the	  
diagonal	  are	  labeled	  high	  risk	  with	  the	  cells	  just	  below	  the	  diagonal	  labeled	  moderate	  risk.	  The	  
cells	  in	  the	  upper	  right-­‐hand	  corner	  with	  high	  likelihood	  and	  catastrophic	  severity	  are	  labeled	  
extreme	  risk	  and	  the	  cells	  in	  the	  lower	  left-­‐hand	  corner	  of	  the	  matrix	  are	  labeled	  low	  risk.	  The	  risk	  
categories	  are	  then	  assigned	  risk	  mitigation	  priorities	  as	  shown.	   	  
	  
	  
Figure	  5-­‐-­‐-­‐13:	  Risk	  Matrix	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The	  following	  definitions	  are	  used	  for	  the	  risk	  description	  categories:	  
	  
Extreme	  -­‐-­‐-­‐	   High-­‐-­‐-­‐risk	  condition	  with	  highest	  priority	  for	  mitigation	  and	  contingency	  
planning	  (immediate	  action).	  
	  
High	  -­‐-­‐-­‐	   Moderate-­‐-­‐-­‐to-­‐-­‐-­‐high-­‐-­‐-­‐risk	  condition	  with	  risk	  addressed	  by	  mitigation	  and	  
contingency	  planning	  (prompt	  action).	  
	  
Moderate	  -­‐-­‐-­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Risk	  condition	  sufficiently	  high	  to	  give	  consideration	  for	  further	  mitigation	  
and	  planning	  (planned	  action).	  
	  
Low	  -­‐-­‐-­‐	   Low-­‐-­‐-­‐risk	  condition	  with	  additional	  mitigation	  contingency	  planning	  (advisory	  
in	  nature).	  
	  
FEMA	  classifies	  risks	  in	  a	  similar	  way	  in	  their	  “MultiHazard	  Identification	  and	  Risk	  Assessment”	  
publication	  using	  the	  following	  categories.	  
	  
Class	  A:	  High-­‐-­‐-­‐risk	  condition	  with	  highest	  priority	  for	  mitigation	  and	  contingency	  
planning	  (immediate	  action).	   High	  Likelihood	  and	  High	  Consequence	  Block	  
	  
Class	  B:	  The	  likelihood	  of	  a	  risk	  is	  high	  but	  the	  consequence	  low.	  Risk	  addressed	  
immediately	  by	  mitigation	  and	  emergency	  preparedness	  and	  contingency	  
planning	  (prompt	  action).	  
	  
Class	  C:	  Risk	  likelihood	  low	  but	  consequences	  high.	   Consideration	  for	  mitigation	  
and	  preparedness	  critical.	  
	  
Class	  D:	  Low-­‐-­‐-­‐risk	  condition	  with	  additional	  mitigation	  contingency	  planning	  
(advisory	  in	  nature).	  Low	  Likelihood	  and	  Low	  Consequence	  Block	  
	  
Because	  a	  ‘risk	  level’	  may	  be	  assigned	  to	  more	  than	  one	  matrix	  box,	  an	  ordered	  list	  of	  risk	  
priorities	  in	  not	  created,	  but	  rather	  several	  categories	  of	  risk	  with	  several	  hazards	  falling	  within	  
each	  category	  group.	  For	  instance,	  if	  a	  50-­‐-­‐-­‐year	  flood	  was	  determined	  to	  be	  a	  Class	  C	  risk,	  and	  
an	  accident	  involving	  a	  truck	  carrying	  hazardous	  materials	  was	  determined	  to	  be	  a	  Class	  C	  risk,	  
then	  these	  two	  would	  be	  considered	  equal	  risks	  according	  to	  the	  risk	  matrix.	  
	  
The	  evaluation	  can	  then	  combine	  these	  categories	  into	  a	  spreadsheet	  to	  reflect:	  
	  
.	   Likelihood:	  is	  the	  hazard	  likely	  to	  occur;	  
.	   Consequences:	  what	  is	  the	  seriousness	  of	  the	  impacts	  of	  the	  hazard;	  
.	   Level	  of	  risk	  as	  determined	  by	  evaluation	  on	  the	  risk	  matrix	  (Extreme	  Risk,	  High	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Risk,	  Moderate	  Risk,	  and	  Low	  Risk);	  
.	   Additional	  considerations	  including:	  
.	  	  	   Other	  organizations	  or	  entities	  that	  are	  impacted	  by	  the	  hazard	  (potential	  
partnerships,	  resources,	  or	  interdependence	  of	  risk	  management	  or	  hazard	  
mitigation	  strategies);	  
.	  	  	   Manageability:	  adequacy	  of	  existing	  or	  potential	  risk	  management	  or	  hazard	  
mitigation	  measures	  or	  controls;	  
.	  	  	   Acceptability:	  is	  the	  risk	  acceptable	  from	  social,	  political,	  economic	  or	  	  
	   environmental	  impacts	  and	  
.	  	  	   Change	  in	  the	  risk	  from	  the	  hazard:	  will	  the	  risk	  remain	  the	  same	  priority	  rating	  	  
(Lunn	  	  2003).	  
	  
Risk	  Strategies	  	  
	  
The	  strategies	  used	  to	  mitigate	  or	  eliminate	  risks	  involve	  decisions	  about	  what	  risks	  to	  treat,	  
what	  risks	  to	  prevent	  at	  all	  costs,	  and	  what	  risks	  can	  be	  disregarded	  because	  of	  either	  low	  
consequence,	  low	  frequency,	  or	  both.	   The	  Risk	  Analysis	  process	  is	  not	  working	  in	  a	  vacuum.	  
There	  are	  many	  factors	  such	  as	  political,	  social,	  or	  economic	  systems	  that	  could	  affect	  the	  
determination	  of	  what	  risks	  are	  acceptable,	  and	  what	  risks	  are	  not.	  
	  
Once	  hazards	  have	  been	  identified,	  analyzed	  and	  evaluated,	  a	  priority	  list	  of	  risks	  that	  must	  be	  
considered	  for	  treatment	  is	  generated.	   Ideally,	  communities	  would	  treat	  all	  risks	  in	  a	  way	  such	  
that	  nobody	  would	  have	  to	  worry	  about	  them	  ever	  again,	  but	  that	  risk-­‐-­‐-­‐free	  world	  scenario	  is	  
inconceivable	  despite	  modern	  technology	  and	  engineering.	   While	  most	  risks	  can	  be	  reduced	  by	  
some	  amount,	  few	  can	  be	  completely	  eliminated,	  and	  rarely	  do	  the	  funds	  exist	  to	  reduce	  all	  of	  
the	  risks	  by	  an	  amount	  that	  is	  acceptable	  to	  all	  people	  in	  the	  community.	  
	  
Another	  factor	  in	  the	  problem	  of	  risk	  acceptability	  and	  mitigation	  relates	  to	  the	  benefits	  
associated	  with	  almost	  every	  risk.	  	  It	  is	  almost	  universally	  true	  that	  a	  benefit	  enjoyed	  by	  a	  
community	  or	  organization	  requires	  some	  acceptance	  or	  tolerance	  of	  an	  associated	  risk.	   Locating	  
a	  business	  near	  a	  water	  feature	  used	  as	  a	  major	  transportation	  route	  may	  expose	  it	  to	  flooding.	  
Locating	  a	  subdivision	  in	  or	  near	  a	  forest	  may	  be	  desirable	  to	  future	  homeowners	  but	  could	  
expose	  the	  residents	  to	  a	  wild-­‐land	  fire	  hazard.	  	  To	  completely	  eliminate	  the	  risk	  will	  in	  many	  
cases	  eliminate	  associated	  benefits	  as	  well.	  
	  
Eliminating	  certain	  risks	  may	  directly	  or	  indirectly	  create	  new	  ones.	   That	  is,	  one	  problem	  may	  
be	  solved	  only	  to	  create	  another.	  For	  instance,	  to	  completely	  eliminate	  the	  risk	  from	  nuclear	  
power	  generation	  plants,	  those	  plants	  would	  need	  to	  be	  dismantled	  and	  taken	  out	  of	  service.	  
The	  resulting	  shortage	  of	  power	  would	  require	  that	  fossil	  fuel	  burning	  plants	  increase	  their	  
production,	  which	  in	  turn	  would	  create	  increased	  carbon-­‐-­‐-­‐based	  pollution	  likely	  resulting	  in	  
increased	  health	  and	  environmental	  risks.	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With	  these	  concerns	  in	  mind,	  a	  thoughtful	  response	  to	  the	  assessed	  risks	  must	  be	  determined.	  
This	  response	  becomes	  the	  organization’s	  risk	  strategy.	  The	  risk	  strategy	  for	  a	  particular	  risk	  
depends	  upon	  the	  risk	  level	  for	  that	  risk.	  A	  mandatory	  risk	  level	  indicates	  a	  risk	  requiring	  
immediate	  attention,	  whereas,	  a	  De	  minimis	  risk	  level	  may	  only	  require	  continued	  observation	  
and	  data	  collection.	  	  It	  may	  also	  be	  determined	  that	  the	  risk	  is	  acceptable.	  
	  
Mandatory	  Risk	  Level	  
	  
This	  type	  of	  risk	  is	  considered	  one	  that	  is	  so	  great	  that	  it	  is	  mandatory	  that	  action	  be	  taken	  to	  deal	  
with	  it.	  	  It	  is	  viewed	  as	  an	  “obnoxious	  risk”	  which	  cannot	  be	  ignored	  and	  strategies	  to	  reduce	  
vulnerability	  to	  it	  are	  mandatory.	   In	  practice,	  this	  level	  is	  generally	  set	  at	  1	  in	  10,000	  risk	  per	  
vulnerable	  individual.	  	  This	  practice	  is	  often	  cited	  in	  regards	  to	  second	  hand	  smoke	  exposure	  or	  
accidents	  in	  the	  workplace	  where	  safety	  measures	  or	  procedures	  are	  required.	  
	  
Extremely	  Low	  Likelihood	  of	  Risk	  
	  
A	  “De	  Minimis”	  risk	  level	  suggests	  that	  the	  statistical	  probability	  of	  a	  specific	  risk	  from	  a	  hazard	  is	  
so	  low	  that	  concern	  is	  not	  merited.	   This	  level	  is	  often	  set	  at	  either	  1	  in	  100,000	  or	  1	  in	  
1,000,000,	  and	  is	  set	  either	  for	  a	  one	  year	  period,	  or	  for	  a	  lifetime	  (70	  years).	   The	  term	  De	  
Minimis	  is	  a	  shortened	  version	  of	  the	  Latin	  phrase	  “de	  minimis	  non	  curat	  lex”	  which	  means	  "the	  
law	  does	  not	  care	  about	  very	  small	  matters".	   This	  concept	  is	  widely	  used	  to	  set	  guidelines	  for	  
levels	  of	  risk	  exposure	  to	  the	  general	  population	  such	  as	  the	  chance	  of	  personal	  injury	  in	  an	  airline	  
crash	  or	  train	  derailment	  or	  a	  reaction	  from	  an	  over	  the	  counter	  medication.	   For	  instance,	  the	  
Environmental	  Protection	  Agency	  has	  set	  de	  minimis	  risk	  levels	  for	  human	  lifetime	  risk	  from	  
pesticides	  at	  1	  in	  1,000,000	  over	  a	  70-­‐year	  lifetime.	   The	  FDA	  (Food	  and	  Drug	  Administration)	  and	  
the	  USDA	  (US	  Department	  of	  Agriculture)	  are	  working	  on	  similar	  regulations	  of	  risk	  for	  food	  
safety.	  
	  
Accept	  the	  Risk	  
	  
One	  option	  is	  to	  simply	  accept	  the	  risk	  given	  the	  present	  situation	  and	  resources	  of	  the	  
community.	  	  A	  specific	  hazard	  event	  may	  have	  a	  very	  low	  probability	  of	  occurrence	  and	  as	  a	  
result	  spending	  any	  amount	  of	  money	  to	  mitigate	  it	  would	  be	  counterproductive	  considering	  
some	  greater	  risk	  reduction	  that	  could	  be	  achieved	  by	  using	  the	  money	  to	  treat	  another	  more	  
probable	  or	  severe	  hazard.	  	  The	  risks	  that	  fall	  within	  the	  lowest	  category	  of	  both	  consequence	  
and	  likelihood	  are	  generally	  the	  risks	  that	  are	  considered	  as	  acceptable.	   Members	  of	  a	  
community	  may	  also	  believe	  that	  the	  level	  of	  a	  risk	  can	  be	  mitigated	  so	  as	  to	  reduce	  the	  most	  
adverse	  consequences.	  Homeowners	  who	  have	  invested	  in	  reducing	  the	  vulnerability	  of	  their	  
homes	  and	  businesses	  that	  have	  spent	  funds	  reducing	  the	  vulnerability	  of	  their	  business	  
property	  may	  believe	  that	  they	  can	  withstand	  a	  disaster	  event	  with	  limited	  property	  damage.	  
Therefore,	  they	  accept	  the	  current	  level	  of	  risk	  to	  their	  property.	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Critical	  Thinking:	  What	  steps	  could	  a	  homeowner	  or	  business	  owner	  do	  in	  your	  area	  to	  reduce	  
the	  vulnerability	  of	  their	  property	  to	  the	  risk	  of	  a	  local	  hazard?	  In	  general,	  how	  do	  we	  transfer	  
our	  financial	  exposure	  to	  risk	  in	  a	  modern	  economy	  to	  a	  willing	  party?	  
	  
Determining	  Risk	  Acceptability	  
	  
Personal,	  political/social,	  and	  economic	  factors	  influence	  the	  determination	  of	  risk	  acceptability.	  




Differences	  in	  individual	  acceptance	  between	  risks	  that	  are	  voluntary	  or	  involuntary	  in	  nature	  are	  
greatly	  determined	  by	  what	  we	  see	  as	  the	  benefit	  from	  the	  risk.	   An	  individual	  is	  more	  likely	  to	  
accept	  a	  voluntary	  risk	  if	  he	  or	  she	  perceives	  that	  the	  benefit	  is	  great.	   Many	  recreational	  activities	  
and	  sports	  involve	  considerable	  levels	  of	  personal	  risk	  entered	  into	  voluntarily.	   Indeed	  the	  thrill	  
of	  the	  risk	  may	  be	  part	  of	  the	  enjoyment	  of	  the	  recreation.	   When	  the	  benefits	  of	  a	  risk	  outweigh	  
the	  costs	  then	  the	  perception	  of	  the	  risk	  is	  reduced.	   In	  this	  case	  the	  threat	  level	  may	  be	  
considered	  acceptable.	  	  In	  some	  cases,	  a	  high	  risk	  may	  be	  accepted	  voluntarily	  and	  a	  lower	  risk	  
imposed	  from	  outside	  may	  not	  be	  acceptable.	   Skydivers	  are	  normally	  well	  acquainted	  with	  the	  
risks	  in	  their	  activity	  but	  find	  the	  experience	  extremely	  rewarding.	  In	  2007,	  the	  U.S.	  parachute	  
association	  data	  suggests	  about	  4	  out	  of	  10,000	  jumps	  resulted	  in	  injury	  and	  1	  out	  of	  100,000	  
jumps	  resulted	  in	  death	  (Hsu	  2009).	  Hsu	  says	  that	  this	  death	  rate	  is	  roughly	  equivalent	  to	  the	  
death	  rate	  of	  women	  in	  childbirth.	  However,	  a	  woman	  will	  only	  give	  birth	  to	  one	  child	  in	  a	  given	  
year	  while	  a	  skydiver	  may	  take	  as	  many	  as	  10	  jumps	  in	  a	  single	  day,	  thus	  greatly	  increasing	  the	  
chance	  of	  their	  involvement	  in	  an	  accident	  and	  hence	  increasing	  the	  risk.	  	  In	  this	  case,	  the	  
skydiver	  is	  clearly	  willing	  to	  tolerate	  the	  voluntary	  risks	  associated	  with	  their	  activity.	  
	  
On	  the	  other	  hand,	  our	  personal	  experience	  and	  knowledge	  of	  a	  risk	  or	  hazard	  may	  lead	  us	  to	  
reject	  voluntarily	  accepting	  the	  risk.	  We	  may	  have	  seen	  first-­‐-­‐-­‐hand	  the	  potential	  outcomes	  from	  
accepting	  a	  voluntary	  risk	  and	  believe	  that	  the	  likelihood	  of	  harm	  is	  so	  great	  or	  the	  consequence	  
is	  so	  severe	  that	  we	  avoid	  the	  risk	  all	  together.	  Consider	  an	  individual	  who	  was	  once	  at	  ease	  
swimming	  in	  the	  ocean	  who	  then	  witnesses	  a	  shark	  attack.	  Their	  perception	  of	  the	  risk	  of	  a	  shark	  
attack	  may	  be	  altered	  by	  the	  experience	  if	  not	  their	  voluntary	  acceptance	  of	  it.	  	  
	  
In	  addition	  to	  our	  willingness	  to	  accept	  risk	  voluntarily,	  risk	  may	  be	  associated	  with	  our	  individual	  
values,	   educational	   experiences,	   exposure	   to	   the	   media	   coverage	   of	   risk	   and	   our	   individual	  




Because	  of	  the	  differences	  in	  the	  makeup	  of	  different	  communities	  and	  populations,	  risk	  
acceptance	  will	  not	  be	  universal	  in	  all	  communities	  and	  cultures.	   Risk	  acceptance	  is	  likely	  to	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change	  from	  place	  to	  place,	  from	  time	  to	  time,	  and	  from	  hazard	  to	  hazard	  (Alesch	  2004).	  
Acceptability	  is	  likely	  to	  change	  even	  within	  individual	  communities	  over	  time	  as	  the	  makeup	  of	  
that	  community	  changes.	  	  It	  is	  these	  differences	  that	  make	  the	  wide	  public	  participation	  in	  the	  
hazards	  analysis	  process	  so	  important.	   Communities	  that	  have	  recently	  experienced	  the	  impacts	  
from	  a	  disaster	  will	  likely	  be	  more	  willing	  to	  learn	  more	  about	  the	  hazard	  that	  caused	  the	  disaster,	  




Economic	  considerations	  of	  risk	  are	  viewed	  by	  federal	  agencies	  such	  as	  the	  U.	  S.	  Army	  Corps	  of	  
Engineers	  from	  a	  cost-­‐benefit	  perspective.	   The	  costs	  of	  reducing	  a	  risk	  will	  need	  to	  be	  compared	  
to	  the	  benefits	  (actual	  risk	  reduction)	  that	  would	  result.	   Regulatory	  agencies	  such	  as	  the	  U.S.	  
Department	  of	  Energy,	  Transportation,	  or	  Environmental	  Protection	  assess	  risk	  for	  private	  
enterprises,	  which	  directly	  deal	  with	  the	  hazardous	  substances.	  Their	  consideration	  includes	  cost	  
factors,	  but	  the	  overall	  public	  health	  and	  environmental	  sustainability	  is	  a	  higher	  priority.	   Local	  
governmental	  agencies	  that	  have	  building	  departments	  issue	  permits	  and	  conduct	  inspections	  to	  
enforce	  building	  codes	  and	  promote	  safety.	   Cost-­‐benefit	  may	  be	  a	  consideration	  in	  the	  initial	  
adoption	  of	  the	  regulations,	  but	  extreme	  events	  such	  as	  hurricanes	  can	  motivate	  public	  officials	  
to	  strengthen	  the	  codes	  to	  provide	  more	  protection	  for	  people	  and	  property.	  Hence,	  cost	  
considerations	  may	  not	  be	  the	  primary	  driver	  of	  the	  new	  standards.	  
	  
Critical	  Thinking:	  	  Cost-­‐-­‐-­‐benefit	  analysis	  is	  a	  tool	  that	  can	  be	  helpful	  in	  understanding	  the	  
implications	  of	  risk	  where	  alternative	  risk	  strategies	  and	  their	  costs	  are	  examined.	  The	  benefits	  
gained	  by	  the	  funds	  expended	  are	  examined.	  	   Associated	  with	  a	  cost-­‐benefit	  analysis	  is	  the	  cost	  
effectiveness	  assessment	  that	  examines	  the	  minimum	  unit	  cost	  to	  reduce	  a	  maximum	  level	  of	  
risk.	  	  Consider	  the	  risks	  associated	  with	  flooding	  in	  a	  flood	  zone	  for	  existing	  homes.	  Suppose	  a	  
house	  is	  constructed	  using	  a	  slab	  on	  grad	  foundation.	  How	  might	  the	  unit	  cost	  of	  raising	  the	  
house	  using	  piers	  be	  reduced?	  What	  modifications	  to	  oil	  carrying	  tankers	  have	  been	  introduced	  to	  
reduce	  the	  cost	  associated	  with	  oil	  spill	  impact?	  Do	  these	  modifications	  make	  sense	  relative	  to	  a	  




In	  1994,	  a	  FEMA	  report	  entitled,	  “Assessment	  of	  the	  State	  of	  the	  Art	  Earthquake	  Loss	  
Estimation	  Methodologies	  (FEMA	  249),	  summarized	  the	  current	  state	  of	  methodologies	  used	  
in	  the	  estimation	  of	  earthquake	  losses.	  This	  report	  led	  to	  the	  development	  of	  a	  catastrophe	  
model,	  Hazard	  U.S.	  or	  HAZUS.	  This	  catastrophe	  model	  helped	  to	  standardize	  how	  hazard	  
losses	  are	  estimated.	  It	  has	  since	  been	  extended	  to	  wind	  and	  flood	  hazards.	  (Grossi	  and	  
Kunreuther	  2005)	  
The	  end	  result	  of	  the	  catastrophe	  model	  can	  either	  be	  a	  GIS	  map	  of	  potential	  losses	  or	  an	  
exceedance	  probability	  (EP)	  graph.	  The	  EP	  graph	  gives	  the	  probability	  that	  a	  given	  level	  of	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loss	  will	  be	  exceeded.	  	  For	  example,	  for	  a	  certain	  inventory	  of	  covered	  buildings	  by	  an	  
insurer,	  the	  EP	  graph	  may	  tell	  the	  insurer	  that	  there	  is	  a	  2%	  chance	  that	  losses	  will	  exceed	  $5	  
million.	  The	  insurer	  can	  then	  use	  this	  information	  to	  help	  judge	  if	  insuring	  this	  inventory	  
poses	  an	  unreasonable	  risk	  to	  the	  company.	  	  
Grossi	  and	  Kunreuther	  (200i)	  identify	  four	  components	  that	  must	  be	  quantified	  for	  a	  
catastrophe	  model,	  the	  hazard,	  the	  inventory,	  vulnerability,	  and	  finally	  the	  loss.	  The	  hazard	  
component	  includes	  the	  probability	  or	  frequency	  of	  occurrence	  as	  well	  as	  different	  
characteristics	  of	  the	  hazard.	  The	  inventory	  includes	  the	  physical	  structures	  and	  property	  in	  
the	  geographic	  area	  being	  assessed.	  	  The	  vulnerability	  component	  then	  takes	  the	  hazard	  
component	  and	  inventory	  component	  as	  inputs	  to	  quantify	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  hazard	  on	  the	  
inventory	  elements.	  This	  may	  include	  damage	  curves	  for	  buildings	  or	  other	  structures,	  
property	  damage,	  contents	  damage,	  or	  business	  interruption	  expenses.	  	  From	  the	  
vulnerability	  output	  potential	  losses	  are	  then	  assessed	  and	  a	  risk	  category	  can	  be	  assigned	  to	  
the	  inventory	  element.	  
Uncertainty	  
No	  matter	  the	  methodology	  used	  to	  assess	  the	  risk	  of	  a	  hazard,	  there	  remains	  the	  uncertainty	  
to	  consider.	  Uncertainty	  can	  exist	  in	  two	  forms.	  There	  is	  uncertainty	  in	  the	  natural	  hazard	  
itself.	  	  This	  type	  of	  uncertainty	  reveals	  itself	  in	  the	  randomness	  of	  occurrence	  as	  well	  as	  the	  
randomness	  in	  the	  severity	  of	  the	  event	  when	  it	  does	  occur.	  This	  uncertainty	  is	  normally	  
captured	  through	  constructing	  probability	  distributions,	  which	  are	  then	  used	  in	  the	  risk	  
assessment.	  	  This	  type	  of	  uncertainty	  cannot	  be	  reduced,	  but	  it	  can	  be	  quantified	  and	  better	  
understood.	  A	  second	  type	  of	  uncertainty	  is	  due	  to	  our	  limited	  or	  incomplete	  data	  related	  to	  
the	  hazard	  and	  limited	  or	  incomplete	  understanding	  related	  to	  the	  science	  describing	  the	  
hazard.	  	  This	  type	  of	  uncertainty	  can	  be	  reduced	  or	  mitigated	  through	  more	  thorough	  data	  
collection,	  data	  collected	  over	  a	  longer	  period	  of	  time,	  and	  advancement	  in	  the	  areas	  of	  
science	  related	  to	  understanding	  the	  events	  underlying	  the	  hazard.	  	  We	  will	  describe	  three	  
ways	  that	  the	  uncertainty	  can	  be	  incorporated	  into	  the	  risk	  assessment,	  logic	  trees,	  
simulation,	  and	  use	  of	  the	  probability	  distributions.	  
Logic	  Tree	  
The	  logic	  tree	  analysis	  method	  as	  used	  in	  hazard	  risk	  assessment	  is	  a	  special	  case	  of	  event	  
tree	  analysis	  (ETA).	  In	  event	  tree	  analysis,	  engineers	  studying	  the	  risk	  of	  a	  system’s	  failure,	  
will	  break	  the	  system	  into	  component	  events.	  A	  particular	  component	  in	  the	  system	  may	  fail	  
or	  not	  fail	  or	  possibly	  be	  in	  one	  of	  several	  states	  with	  each	  state	  having	  a	  certain	  probability	  
of	  occurring.	  A	  logic	  tree	  is	  then	  constructed	  showing	  all	  possible	  outcomes.	  The	  probability	  
of	  a	  path	  occurring	  is	  then	  found	  by	  taking	  the	  product	  of	  the	  probabilities	  of	  the	  individual	  
events	  in	  the	  path.	  For	  example,	  suppose	  an	  engineer	  wishes	  to	  study	  the	  failure	  of	  system	  
with	  components	  A	  and	  B.	  The	  components	  have	  the	  following	  failure	  characteristics:	  




Figure	  5-­‐-­‐-­‐14:	  Component	  Failure	  
	  
Figure	  5-­‐-­‐-­‐15:	  Logic	  Tree	  for	  System	  Success	  
	  
To	  construct	  the	  logic	  tree	  diagram	  the	  first	  stage	  after	  initiation	  represents	  the	  state	  of	  
component	  A	  and	  the	  second	  stage	  represents	  the	  state	  of	  component	  B.	  In	  the	  above	  logic	  
tree	  diagram	  the	  system	  only	  works	  if	  both	  components	  are	  successful	  in	  performing	  their	  
function.	  Hence,	  the	  system	  works	  only	  if	  the	  top	  branch	  illustrates	  the	  system’s	  functionality.	  
The	  probability	  of	  the	  system	  working	  is	  0.97	  x	  0.95	  =	  .9215	  or	  92.15%.	  The	  other	  three	  
branches:	  SF,	  FS,	  FF	  show	  the	  three	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  system	  can	  fail.	  
In	  order	  to	  apply	  the	  logic	  tree	  to	  risk	  assessment,	  we	  define	  the	  component	  events	  as	  either	  
intermediate	  events	  or	  procedures	  leading	  to	  the	  final	  outcome	  of	  a	  hazard	  event	  or	  as	  model	  
parameters	  leading	  to	  the	  final	  model	  result.	  For	  example,	  suppose	  the	  risk	  being	  assessed	  is	  
a	  nuclear	  terrorism	  event.	  Event	  A	  may	  represent	  the	  type	  of	  attack	  (a	  nuclear	  explosion	  or	  a	  
nuclear	  dispersion),	  event	  B	  may	  represent	  the	  type	  of	  material	  (high	  half-­‐life,	  low	  half-­‐life),	  
event	  C	  may	  represent	  density	  of	  population	  in	  affected	  area,	  etc.	  	  Or	  suppose	  the	  event	  being	  
assessed	  is	  the	  risk	  of	  fatalities	  from	  a	  category	  3	  or	  higher	  hurricane	  striking	  a	  particular	  
land	  area	  in	  the	  Gulf	  of	  Mexico.	  To	  illustrate	  the	  logic	  tree	  model,	  a	  simplified	  version	  of	  an	  
example	  given	  in	  chapter	  3	  of	  the	  book	  Quantifying	  and	  Controlling	  Catastrophic	  Risks	  by	  B.	  
John	  Garrick	  is	  constructed	  (2008).	  The	  reader	  may	  wish	  to	  consult	  (Garrick	  2008)	  for	  a	  
more	  detailed	  and	  comprehensive	  discussion	  of	  the	  hurricane	  impact	  model.	  	  Also,	  Grossi	  and	  
Kunreuther	  (2005)	  apply	  the	  logic	  tree	  method	  to	  demonstrate	  the	  incorporation	  of	  
uncertainty	  into	  landslide	  risk	  pp.	  74	  –	  79.	  	  The	  parameters	  in	  the	  logic	  tree	  diagram	  are	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defined	  as	  follows:	  
	  
A	  –	  the	  time	  the	  hurricane	  spends	  in	  the	  gulf	  before	  landfall	  [<48hr,	  48-­‐72hr,	  >72hrs]	  
B	  –	  whether	  the	  hurricane	  impacts	  the	  area	  being	  studied	  [Yes,	  No]	  
C	  –	  the	  category	  of	  the	  hurricane	  [3,	  4,	  5]	  
D	  –	  The	  type	  of	  evacuation	  prior	  to	  landfall.[Minimal,	  Medium,	  Full]	  
	  
To	  fully	  utilize	  this	  method	  in	  obtaining	  a	  numerical	  value	  for	  risk,	  a	  consequence	  with	  
damage	  estimation	  for	  each	  branch	  of	  the	  logic	  tree	  needs	  to	  be	  determined.	  Garrick	  (2008)	  
uses	  6	  damage	  states	  for	  the	  final	  stage	  in	  his	  logic	  tree	  assessment	  for	  hurricane	  fatalities	  
affecting	  New	  Orleans.	  He	  labels	  his	  damage	  states	  1	  through	  6	  with	  1	  being	  the	  most	  severe.	  
Therefore,	  damage	  state	  1	  would	  occur	  if	  there	  was	  a	  category	  5	  hurricane	  in	  the	  gulf	  for	  less	  
than	  48	  hours	  with	  minimal	  evacuation	  that	  affected	  New	  Orleans.	  Whereas	  damage	  state	  6	  
would	  occur	  if	  there	  was	  a	  category	  3	  hurricane	  in	  the	  gulf	  for	  more	  than	  72	  hours	  before	  
landfall	  with	  full	  evacuation	  that	  affected	  New	  Orleans.	  In	  our	  illustration,	  we	  will	  refer	  to	  the	  
damage	  states	  as	  impact	  states	  and	  reverse	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  numbers	  and	  use	  lower	  
impact	  states	  for	  less	  consequence.	  
To	  provide	  a	  numerical	  example,	  we	  assume	  some	  hypothetical	  values:	  
A	  –	  the	  time	  the	  hurricane	  spends	  in	  the	  gulf	  before	  landfall	  [<48hr	  (.2)	  ,	  >48hrs	  (.8)]	  
B	  –	  whether	  the	  hurricane	  cat	  3	  -­‐	  5	  impacts	  New	  Orleans	  [Yes	  (.05),	  No	  (.95)]	  	  	  
C	  –	  the	  category	  of	  the	  hurricane	  [3	  (.6),	  4	  (.4)	  ,	  5	  (0)]	  
D	  –	  The	  type	  of	  evacuation	  prior	  to	  landfall.[Minimal	  ,	  Medium,	  Full	  ]	  
E	  –	  Impact	  state	  [0	  –	  0	  lives,	  1	  -­‐	  50	  lives,	  2	  -­‐	  750	  lives,	  3	  –	  1,500	  lives	  ,	  4	  –	  10,000	  lives],	  	  
The	  probabilities	  appear	  in	  parenthesis.	  Since	  we	  are	  simplifying	  the	  example,	  we	  have	  
assigned	  a	  probability	  of	  0	  to	  a	  category	  5	  storm.	  Hence	  it	  will	  not	  appear	  in	  the	  logic	  
diagram.	  For	  simplicity,	  the	  probability	  for	  type	  of	  evacuation	  will	  only	  be	  a	  function	  of	  the	  
time	  the	  storm	  spends	  in	  the	  gulf	  before	  landfall.	  Of	  course,	  in	  reality,	  this	  probability	  will	  
depend	  on	  many	  events	  including	  the	  size	  of	  the	  storm	  reported	  and	  the	  action	  of	  state	  and	  
local	  officials.	  For	  our	  example,	  we	  use	  the	  following	  table	  of	  values:	  
	  
Figure	  5-­‐-­‐-­‐16:	  Evacuation	  Success	  Probabilities	  for	  Time	  the	  Hurricane	  
Spends	  in	  the	  Gulf	  




The	  Impact	  state	  [IS]	  (expected	  number	  of	  fatalities)	  will	  be	  function	  of	  the	  size	  of	  the	  storm	  and	  type	  
of	  evacuation	  according	  to	  the	  table:	  
	  
	  
Figure	  5-­‐-­‐-­‐17:	  Impact	  States	  by	  type	  of	  Evacuation	  
	  
Finally,	  the	  initiation	  event	  is	  the	  moment	  a	  major	  hurricane	  is	  reported	  to	  appear	  in	  the	  Gulf	  of	  
Mexico.	  The	  logic	  tree	  describing	  this	  model	  is	  shown	  in	  Figure	  5-­‐18.	  The	  stages	  in	  the	  logic	  tree	  
model	  beyond	  initiation	  illustrated	  from	  left	  to	  right	  are	  the	  time	  spent	  in	  the	  gulf	  (TIME),	  whether	  it	  
will	  impact	  New	  Orleans	  (IMPACT),	  the	  category	  (CAT),	  the	  evacuation	  success	  (EVAC),	  and	  the	  storm	  
impact	  status	  (IS).	  	  
	  
Figure	  5-­‐-­‐-­‐18:	  Logic	  Tree	  for	  Hurricane	  Impact	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We	  can	  now	  use	  the	  logic	  diagram	  to	  calculate	  probabilities	  as	  well	  as	  to	  quantify	  the	  risk.	  For	  
example,	  following	  the	  branch	  in	  the	  diagram	  in	  a	  lighter	  shade	  of	  orange,	  after	  a	  major	  hurricane	  
appears	  in	  the	  gulf,	  the	  probability	  of	  the	  storm	  appearing	  in	  the	  gulf	  less	  than	  48	  hours	  before	  
land	  fall	  (0.2),	  impacting	  New	  Orleans	  (0.5),	  being	  category	  3	  (0.6),	  with	  medium	  evacuation	  
success	  (0.2)	  is	  	  
𝟎.𝟐×𝟎.𝟎𝟓×𝟎.𝟔×𝟎.𝟐 = 𝟎.𝟎𝟎𝟏𝟐	  
Since	  the	  scenario	  of	  a	  category	  3	  storm	  with	  medium	  evacuation	  success	  yields	  impact	  state	  2,	  
the	  fatality	  risk	  for	  the	  stated	  scenario	  is	  0.0012×750 = 0.9.	  Notice	  we	  have	  calculated	  the	  risk	  
for	  one	  of	  sixteen	  possible	  scenarios.	  To	  calculate	  the	  total	  risk,	  we	  add	  the	  risk	  from	  all	  sixteen	  
paths.	  	  	  
We	  can	  also	  calculate	  the	  distribution	  of	  probabilities	  for	  the	  impact	  states	  from	  the	  logic	  tree.	  
For	  example,	  there	  are	  two	  paths	  in	  the	  tree	  leading	  to	  impact	  state	  2:	  
1. <48	  hours,	  YES,	  CAT3,	  MED	  :	  	  	  	  𝟎.𝟐×𝟎.𝟎𝟓×𝟎.𝟔×𝟎.𝟐 = 𝟎.𝟎𝟎𝟏𝟐	  
2. >48	  hours,	  YES,	  CAT3,	  MED:          𝟎.𝟖×𝟎.𝟎𝟓×𝟎.𝟔×𝟎.𝟖 = 𝟎.𝟎𝟏𝟗𝟐	  
Therefore,	  the	  probability	  that	  after	  a	  storm	  enters	  the	  gulf	  it	  will	  lead	  to	  impact	  state	  2	  in	  New	  
Orleans	  is	  0.0012	  +	  0.0192	  =	  0.0204.	  This	  can	  be	  done	  for	  each	  impact	  state	  yielding	  the	  
distribution	  for	  the	  impact	  states	  Figure	  5-­‐19.	  	  	  
	  
Figure	  5-­‐-­‐-­‐19:	  Distribution	  for	  Hurricane	  Model	  Impact	  States	  




Critical	  Thinking:	  	  Describe	  the	  four	  paths	  in	  the	  logic	  tree	  leading	  to	  impact	  state	  3.	  Calculate	  the	  
probability	  that	  after	  the	  storm	  enters	  the	  gulf	  that	  it	  will	  lead	  to	  impact	  state	  3	  and	  compare	  
your	  solution	  to	  the	  probability	  in	  Figure	  5-­‐19.	  
Monte	  Carlo	  Method	  or	  Simulation	  
After	  constructing	  a	  model	  for	  all	  of	  the	  inputs	  to	  our	  hazard	  analysis,	  which	  may	  consist	  of	  
probability	  distributions,	  calculus	  type	  models,	  or	  probabilities	  for	  categorical	  descriptions,	  
we	  can	  in	  theory	  determine	  the	  risk	  of	  the	  hazard.	  We	  could	  simplify	  the	  uncertainty	  involved	  
by	  making	  enough	  simplifying	  assumptions	  to	  construct	  a	  logic	  diagram	  as	  previously	  shown.	  
However,	  modern	  technology	  also	  allows	  us	  to	  simulate	  the	  hazard	  event.	  	  Using	  random	  
values	  to	  simulate	  the	  value	  for	  a	  model	  or	  a	  model	  parameter	  is	  called	  a	  Monte	  Carlo	  
method.	  	  
For	  example,	  in	  the	  hurricane	  model	  above,	  either	  before	  or	  at	  the	  time	  the	  storm	  enters	  the	  
gulf,	  we	  may	  use	  historical	  data	  to	  arrive	  at	  the	  probability	  that	  the	  storm	  will	  impact	  New	  
Orleans.	  However,	  modern	  hurricane	  models	  make	  projections	  as	  to	  where	  the	  storm	  will	  
make	  landfall	  using	  probability	  distributions.	  The	  probability	  that	  the	  storm	  will	  affect	  New	  
Orleans	  will	  not	  remained	  fixed.	  It	  will	  change	  as	  the	  storm	  progresses	  through	  the	  Gulf	  of	  
Mexico.	  At	  a	  point	  in	  time,	  computer	  models	  may	  indicate	  a	  probability	  distribution	  for	  the	  
storm	  to	  impact	  New	  Orleans.	  For	  a	  numerical	  example,	  suppose	  that	  distribution	  is	  given	  by	  
Figure	  5-­‐20.	  
	  
Figure	  5-­‐-­‐-­‐20:	  Distribution	  for	  landfall	  
	  
Reading	  the	  table	  given	  in	  Figure	  5-­‐20,	  there	  is	  a	  0.75	  probability	  of	  no	  landfall	  in	  New	  Orleans;	  
there	  is	  a	  0.13	  probability	  of	  a	  5%	  chance	  of	  landfall;	  etc.	  The	  second	  column	  is	  the	  cumulative	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distribution.	  We	  use	  the	  cumulative	  distribution	  to	  perform	  the	  simulation.	  In	  this	  case,	  the	  
computer	  program	  will	  choose	  a	  random	  integer	  from	  1	  to	  100.	  If	  the	  random	  integer	  is	  between	  
1	  and	  75,	  inclusive	  then	  a	  0%	  chance	  would	  be	  used	  for	  the	  hurricane	  making	  landfall	  in	  New	  
Orleans.	  If	  the	  integer	  is	  between	  76	  and	  88,	  inclusive	  then	  a	  5%	  chance	  would	  be	  used	  for	  the	  
hurricane	  making	  landfall	  in	  New	  Orleans.	  If	  the	  integer	  is	  between	  89	  and	  95,	  inclusive	  we	  would	  
use	  30%	  and	  if	  it	  is	  between	  96	  and	  100,	  inclusive	  then	  we	  would	  use	  50%.	  	  Each	  choice	  of	  a	  
random	  number	  will	  provide	  a	  probability	  of	  landfall	  to	  use	  in	  determining	  the	  risk	  from	  the	  
storm.	  For	  example,	  suppose	  the	  random	  integer	  23	  is	  generated.	  Then	  a	  probability	  of	  0	  
impacting	  New	  Orleans	  is	  used	  rather	  than	  0.05	  (5%)	  in	  the	  logic	  tree	  above.	  In	  this	  case	  the	  only	  
relevant	  impact	  state	  would	  be	  0.	  However,	  if	  the	  integer	  90	  is	  generated,	  then	  a	  probability	  of	  
0.3	  (30%)	  impacting	  New	  Orleans	  would	  be	  used	  rather	  than	  0.05.	  A	  large	  number	  of	  scenarios	  
can	  then	  be	  used,	  such	  as	  10,000,	  with	  the	  risk	  calculated	  for	  each	  scenario.	  	  The	  final	  result	  will	  
be	  a	  distribution	  of	  values	  for	  either	  the	  damage	  state	  or	  the	  risk.	  	  
The	  previous	  example	  shows	  how	  to	  perform	  the	  simulation	  in	  the	  case	  of	  one	  input	  having	  
uncertainty.	  This	  method	  can	  be	  further	  extended	  in	  the	  case	  simulation	  is	  needed	  for	  more	  than	  
one	  input	  or	  model	  parameter.	  	  
Uncertainty	  Expressed	  in	  Interval	  Estimates	  
Suppose	  the	  damage	  states	  for	  the	  hurricane	  model	  represent	  the	  consequence	  in	  terms	  of	  
structural	  loss,	  recovery	  expense,	  and	  other	  economic	  losses	  rather	  than	  loss	  of	  lives.	  Using	  
damage	  states	  1	  -­‐	  $0	  through	  9	  -­‐	  $10M	  with	  each	  damage	  state	  representing	  $1.25M	  more	  
damage	  than	  the	  previous	  damage	  state,	  we	  may	  obtain	  a	  distribution	  of	  losses	  due	  to	  a	  category	  
3	  hurricane	  striking	  a	  specified	  city	  as	  shown	  in	  the	  table	  in	  Figure	  5-­‐21.	  
	  
Figure	  5-­‐-­‐-­‐21:	  Distribution	  for	  Hurricane	  Model	  Damages	  
	  
We	  can	  also	  view	  this	  distribution	  graphically	  in	  the	  form	  of	  a	  histogram,	  Figure	  5-­‐22.	  In	  this	  graph	  
the	  damage	  states	  are	  on	  the	  horizontal	  axis	  and	  the	  probabilities	  on	  the	  vertical	  axis.	  The	  height	  
of	  the	  bar	  above	  the	  damage	  state	  shows	  the	  probability	  the	  damage	  state	  will	  occur.	  For	  
example,	  the	  height	  of	  the	  bar	  above	  damage	  state	  7	  is	  0.25	  indicating	  a	  probability	  of	  0.25	  that	  
there	  will	  be	  $7.5	  M	  in	  damage	  if	  a	  category	  3	  storm	  should	  strike	  this	  particular	  city.	  	  Since	  each	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bar	  in	  the	  histogram	  has	  width	  1,	  it	  is	  also	  convenient	  to	  view	  the	  area	  of	  each	  bar	  as	  the	  
probability	  of	  the	  occurrence	  of	  the	  damage	  state.	  	  	  
	  
Figure	  5-­‐-­‐-­‐22:	  The	  Histogram	  for	  the	  Distribution	  for	  Hurricane	  Model	  Damages	  
The	  expected	  damage	  can	  be	  calculated	  by	  multiplying	  each	  damage	  value	  by	  the	  probability	  
of	  its	  occurrence	  and	  summing	  over	  all	  of	  the	  damage	  states.	  The	  expected	  damage	  from	  the	  
distribution	  above	  is	  Cost	  times	  Probability	  for	  each	  Damage	  State	  or	  1.25×.04+ 2.50×.06+
3.75×.07+ 5.00×.11+ 6.25×.18+ 7.50×.25+ 8.75×.19+ 10.00×.10 = $6.675𝑀.	  
	  
$6.675M	  can	  then	  be	  used	  as	  the	  consequence	  in	  calculating	  the	  risk,	  however,	  the	  
distribution	  of	  damages	  provides	  more	  information	  than	  just	  the	  expected	  damage.	  It	  may	  
also	  be	  used	  to	  express	  the	  uncertainty	  in	  the	  estimates.	  	  For	  example,	  there	  is	  a	  0.54	  
probability	  that	  the	  category	  3	  hurricane	  will	  cause	  damage	  in	  the	  interval	  [$5M,	  $7.5M].	  We	  
obtain	  this	  probability	  by	  adding	  the	  probabilities	  for	  damage	  states	  5,	  6,	  and	  7.	  We	  can	  view	  
this	  and	  its	  probability	  graphically	  by	  observing	  the	  area	  of	  the	  bars	  over	  damage	  states	  5,	  6,	  
and	  7	  in	  the	  histogram	  (area	  between	  the	  vertical	  bars)	  as	  shown	  in	  Figure	  5-­‐23.	  	  Using	  this	  
distribution,	  we	  can	  also	  conclude	  that	  there	  is	  a	  10%	  chance	  of	  damage	  being	  $10M.	  
Therefore,	  in	  this	  example,	  $8.75M	  (damage	  state	  8)	  is	  called	  the	  90th	  percentile	  since	  the	  
probability	  that	  the	  damage	  will	  be	  less	  than	  or	  equal	  to	  $8.75M	  is	  0.9.	  	  




Figure	  5-­‐-­‐-­‐23:	  The	  Histogram	  View	  for	  the	  Interval	  of	  Estimation	  [$5M,	  $7.5M].	  
	  
When	  calculating	  parameter	  values	  from	  historical	  data,	  it	  is	  common	  to	  use	  the	  sample	  
mean	  for	  the	  parameter	  as	  the	  point	  estimate	  for	  the	  true	  mean	  of	  the	  parameter	  value	  and	  
use	  the	  95%	  confidence	  interval	  for	  the	  interval	  estimate.	  In	  this	  case,	  if	  the	  data	  set	  is	  large,	  
then	  the	  sample	  mean	  has	  an	  approximate	  normal	  distribution	  that	  can	  be	  used	  to	  identify	  
the	  interval	  estimate.	  In	  general,	  if	  𝑥	  denotes	  the	  sample	  mean,	  𝜎	  denotes	  the	  sample	  
standard	  deviation,	  and	  these	  statistics	  are	  calculated	  from	  𝑛	  data	  values	  then	  the	  95%	  








	  For	  example,	  in	  an	  earthquake	  hazard	  model	  suppose	  a	  parameter	  in	  the	  model	  is	  the	  
average	  time	  a	  3.0	  earthquake	  lasts	  at	  a	  particular	  fault.	  If	  historically	  there	  are	  60	  such	  
earthquakes	  recorded	  for	  this	  fault	  and	  the	  average	  duration	  is	  45	  seconds	  with	  a	  sample	  
standard	  deviation	  of	  12.4	  seconds,	  then	  the	  95%	  confidence	  interval	  estimation	  for	  a	  3.0	  







= 41.9, 48.1 .	  
We	  interpret	  this	  interval	  of	  estimation	  by	  stating	  that	  we	  are	  95%	  confident	  the	  true	  mean	  
duration	  of	  3.0	  earthquakes	  at	  this	  particular	  fault	  is	  between	  41.9	  seconds	  and	  48.1	  seconds.	  
Notice,	  if	  we	  base	  our	  estimate	  on	  fewer	  data	  values,	  this	  causes	  a	  wider	  interval	  estimation	  
reflecting	  the	  fact	  that	  we	  should	  view	  our	  point	  estimate	  for	  the	  parameter	  as	  having	  less	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= 40.1, 49.9 ,	  
indicating	  more	  uncertainty	  about	  the	  true	  parameter	  value.	  	  
Landslide	  hazards	  present	  a	  complex	  scenario	  to	  analyze.	  Among	  the	  complexities	  identified	  
by	  Glade	  (2003)	  and	  Uzielli	  et.	  al.	  (2008)	  is	  the	  site-­‐specific	  nature	  of	  the	  phenomena	  and	  the	  
difficulty	  in	  quantifying	  the	  spatial	  aspect	  of	  the	  hazard.	  To	  help	  overcome	  these	  difficulties,	  
in	  landslide	  hazard	  analysis	  it	  has	  become	  accepted	  practice	  to	  divide	  consequence	  into	  two	  
components,	  vulnerability	  (V)	  and	  the	  cost	  of	  items	  at	  risk	  (CI).	  Hence,	  the	  risk	  equation	  
becomes	  = 𝑃 ∙ 𝐶 = 𝑃 ∙ 𝑉 ∙ 𝐶! 	  .	  The	  vulnerability	  is	  then	  defined	  both	  in	  terms	  of	  landslide	  
intensity	  and	  the	  susceptibility	  of	  the	  inventory	  at	  risk	  𝑉 = 𝐼 ∙ 𝑆	  (Uzielli	  et.	  al.	  2008).	  This	  
enables	  the	  authors	  to	  develop	  separate	  and	  independent	  models	  for	  the	  landslide	  intensity	  
and	  the	  susceptibility	  of	  the	  local	  structures,	  which	  are	  of	  varying	  ages	  and	  subject	  to	  local	  
building	  codes	  and	  construction	  techniques.	  Further	  in	  a	  follow-­‐up	  paper	  the	  authors	  explore	  
the	  uncertainty	  in	  the	  vulnerability	  component	  by	  providing	  upper	  and	  lower	  thresholds	  
resulting	  in	  an	  interval	  of	  estimation	  for	  vulnerability	  (Kanya	  et.	  al.	  2008).	  	  
Summary	  
	  
We	  have	  explored	  how	  experts	  analyze	  risk	  in	  human	  and	  natural	  caused	  hazards.	  Experts	  
identify	  hazards	  that	  are	  probable	  to	  impact	  a	  location.	  The	  structures	  and	  inhabitants	  in	  
that	  location	  are	  assessed	  for	  their	  vulnerability	  to	  each	  risk.	  This	  assessment	  relies	  upon	  
historical	  data,	  current	  data,	  socio-­‐economic	  data,	  local	  demographics,	  and	  judgment.	  	  In	  
some	  cases	  hazard	  models	  are	  constructed	  in	  order	  to	  incorporate	  scientific	  and	  statistical	  
information	  into	  the	  assessment.	  Software	  packages	  such	  as	  GIS	  can	  provide	  insight	  into	  the	  
spatial	  distribution	  of	  the	  risk	  being	  considered.	  The	  amount,	  quality	  and	  the	  depth	  of	  the	  
data	  are	  important	  factors	  in	  establishing	  parameter	  values,	  inputs	  for	  hazard	  models,	  as	  
well	  as	  providing	  a	  basis	  for	  decisions	  made	  about	  risk	  strategies.	  In	  the	  risk	  analysis	  
process,	  both	  quantitative	  and	  qualitative	  analysis	  are	  utilized.	  If	  the	  probability	  and	  
consequence	  of	  a	  hazard	  event	  occurrence	  can	  be	  numerically	  established,	  then	  the	  risk	  for	  
that	  hazard	  event	  can	  be	  calculated	  as	  the	  probability	  times	  the	  consequence.	  Tools	  such	  as	  
the	  risk-­‐matrix	  help	  to	  place	  each	  risk	  into	  categories	  such	  as	  low,	  medium,	  high,	  or	  extreme.	  
Using	  this	  relative	  ranking	  of	  risks,	  risk	  managers	  can	  then	  formulate	  risk	  strategies	  
appropriate	  to	  each	  hazard.	  These	  strategies	  may	  include	  simple	  risk	  mitigation	  measures	  
for	  low	  and	  medium	  risks,	  risk	  acceptance	  for	  some	  risks,	  and	  planning	  or	  immediate	  action,	  
such	  as	  recommendations	  for	  regulation,	  for	  more	  extreme	  risks.	  	  Further,	  the	  risk	  managers	  
and	  experts	  are	  faced	  with	  the	  challenge	  of	  communicating	  this	  technical	  information	  and	  its	  
interpretation	  to	  the	  public	  and	  policymakers.	  As	  was	  said	  in	  the	  beginning,	  the	  goal	  is	  to	  
provide	  decision-­‐makers	  with	  the	  right	  information,	  at	  the	  right	  level	  of	  complexity,	  at	  the	  
right	  time.	  
	  
Advanced	  instrumentation	  for	  collecting	  the	  data	  and	  the	  increase	  in	  scientific	  knowledge	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and	  technology	  have	  most	  certainly	  contributed	  to	  a	  more	  accurate	  assessment	  of	  risks	  and	  
its	  communication	  to	  decision-­‐makers.	  However,	  hazard	  events	  seem	  to	  regularly	  catch	  us	  
off	  our	  guard	  and	  cause	  billions	  of	  dollars	  in	  damage	  as	  well	  as	  cause	  human	  suffering	  and	  
loss	  of	  life.	  This	  reminds	  us	  that	  knowing	  the	  chance	  of	  something	  happening	  does	  not	  tell	  us	  
when	  or	  where	  it	  will	  happen	  or	  even	  whether	  it	  will	  happen.	  Much	  of	  our	  expectations	  
about	  the	  present	  and	  future	  are	  based	  upon	  past	  trends	  and	  occurrences.	  	  However,	  we	  
must	  explore	  more	  thoroughly	  whether	  past	  trends	  will	  continue	  or	  will	  change	  into	  new	  
trends.	  Many	  hazards	  affecting	  large	  portions	  of	  world	  populations	  are	  climate	  related,	  such	  
as	  droughts,	  floods,	  destructive	  storms,	  a	  rising	  sea	  level,	  long-­‐term	  temperature	  changes,	  
insect	  infestation,	  and	  potable	  water	  availability.	  	  The	  earth’s	  climate	  is	  a	  dynamical	  system,	  
difficult	  to	  model,	  and	  changes	  in	  climate	  are	  difficult	  to	  predict.	  It	  changes	  through	  natural	  
cycles	  and	  due	  to	  natural	  causes	  as	  well	  as	  the	  impact	  of	  human	  activity.	  	  As	  human	  impact	  
on	  the	  climate	  increases,	  some	  changes	  may	  be	  accelerated	  or	  even	  be	  different	  than	  
expected.	  The	  emission	  of	  green	  house	  gasses	  and	  its	  environmental	  impact	  has	  been	  
receiving	  increased	  attention	  as	  our	  consumption	  of	  carbon-­‐based	  fuels	  continues	  to	  rise.	  	  As	  
an	  example	  of	  how	  climate	  change	  affects	  our	  knowledge	  of	  a	  hazard,	  consider	  the	  coastal	  
flooding	  hazard	  associated	  with	  a	  change	  in	  sea	  level.	  	  According	  to	  NOAA’s	  ocean	  facts,	  in	  
2010,	  	  39%	  of	  the	  US	  population	  lived	  in	  coastal	  counties	  with	  a	  population	  density	  six	  times	  
that	  of	  inland	  counties.	  This	  is	  consistent	  with	  the	  estimates	  that	  40%	  of	  the	  world’s	  
population	  lives	  within	  100	  kilometers	  of	  the	  coast.	  	  For	  these	  residents,	  rising	  sea	  levels	  
pose	  an	  alarming	  problem.	  The	  source	  of	  this	  problem	  lies	  in	  the	  thermal	  expansion	  of	  
warming	  ocean	  waters	  and	  the	  melting	  ice	  sheets.	  	  Both	  of	  these	  factors	  are	  related	  to	  a	  
warming	  climate.	  The	  IPCC	  (Intergovernmental	  Panel	  on	  Climate	  Change)	  regards	  ice	  sheet	  
melting	  as	  the	  major	  unknown	  factor	  to	  predicting	  future	  sea	  level	  rises	  (Quaile	  2013).	  Just	  a	  
generation	  ago,	  it	  was	  difficult	  to	  imagine	  an	  ice-­‐free	  artic	  summer.	  With	  satellite	  data,	  
scientists	  are	  now	  predicting	  an	  ice-­‐free	  artic	  summer	  within	  decades.	  Erik	  Ivins,	  who	  
coordinated	  a	  new	  study	  for	  NASA	  on	  ice	  sheet	  melting,	  says	  that	  the	  rate	  of	  ice	  loss	  from	  the	  
Greenland	  ice	  sheet	  has	  increased	  five-­‐fold	  since	  the	  mid-­‐1990’s,	  and	  the	  melting	  ice	  from	  
both	  poles	  is	  responsible	  for	  one	  -­‐	  fifth	  of	  the	  global	  rise	  in	  sea	  level	  (Quaile	  2013).	  	  Clearly	  
historical	  trends	  in	  coastal	  flooding	  and	  its	  causes	  will	  not	  be	  as	  useful	  in	  assessing	  this	  risk	  
in	  the	  future.	  Hence	  the	  challenges	  facing	  risk	  assessors	  and	  risk	  managers	  include	  the	  past	  
challenges	  of	  data	  collection	  and	  mining,	  building	  or	  using	  models	  and	  new	  technology,	  and	  
effectively	  communicating	  their	  results	  to	  decision	  makers	  and	  the	  public,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  new	  
challenge	  of	  how	  to	  utilize	  our	  knowledge	  of	  a	  changing	  climate.	  
	  
	  
	   	  





Would	  you	  classify	  a	  risk	  as	  voluntary	  or	  involuntary	  where	  changes	  in	  factors	  influencing	  the	  
frequency	  and	  severity	  of	  local	  flooding	  have	  changed	  without	  the	  knowledge	  of	  the	  
community?	  
	  
What	  risks	  would	  be	  included	  as	  obnoxious	  where	  mandatory	  action	  is	  required?	  
	  
What	  risks	  do	  you	  consider	  to	  be	  unacceptable	  where	  others	  have	  determined	  that	  they	  can	  
live	  with	  the	  hazard?	  What	  personal	  views,	  values,	  beliefs,	  or	  your	  personality	  contribute	  to	  this	  




Using	  the	  risk	  matrix	  categories	  included	  in	  Figures	  5-­‐11	  and	  5-­‐12,	  examine	  the	  hazards	  in	  





The	  ERPG	  guidelines	  are	  clearly	  defined	  and	  are	  based	  on	  extensive,	  current	  data.	   The	  rationale	  
for	  selecting	  each	  value	  is	  explained,	  and	  other	  pertinent	  information	  is	  also	  provided.	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